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## Worldwide Report

# NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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25 November 1985

# WORLDWIDE REPORT

## NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

### CONTENTS

#### ASIA

##### JAPAN

- Nakasone Discusses Disarmament in U.S. Press Conference  
(Yasuhiro Nakasone; Tokyo NHK Television Network, 25 Oct 85) 1

##### NEW ZEALAND

- Greenpeace Claims Gains Against French Nuclear Tests  
(Hong Kong AFP, 28 Oct 85; Wellington Overseas Service,  
28 Oct 85) ..... 4
- Paris Poll Cited 4
- Delays Credited 4

#### CANADA

- Plan To Build, Operate Candu Reactor in Turkey Questioned  
(Margaret Munro; Vancouver THE SUN, 23 Aug 85) ..... 6
- U.S. Decision To Keep Storage Sites Away From Border Noted  
(Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 12 Sep 85) ..... 7
- Physicians Urged To Join Fight Against Nuclear Weapons  
(Vancouver THE SUN, 13 Sep 85) ..... 8
- Views Mixed on Scrapping Darlington Nuclear Plant  
(Ottawa THE CITIZEN, 12 Sep 85) ..... 9
- London Nuclear Role in Cleaning Reactors Discussed  
(Thomas Claridge; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 30 Aug 85) 10

## EAST EUROPE

### BULGARIA

Progress Report on Construction of 1,000 MW Nuclear Unit (Various sources, 3, 5 Sep 85) .....	12
New Technological Successes Reported, by Katya Yaneva	12
Workers Responsible for Installing Cupola	14
Story of Cupola's Raising Recounted, by Vasil Pavlov	14

## LATIN AMERICA

### BRAZIL

Minister Chaves Reacts to U.S. Senator's Remarks (Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 25 Oct 85) .....	17
PRC Reacts to U.S. Senator's Statements on Nuclear Exports (Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 24 Oct 85) .....	18
Relations, Plans for Agreements With PRC Reviewed (Francisco Roque Bacarreza; Madrid EFE, 30 Oct 85) .....	19
Briefs	
STF on Nuclear Laws	21

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

### INDIA

Papers Report U.S. Regional Nuclear Policy Developments (Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA, 18 Sep 85; New Delhi PATRIOT, 19 Sep 85) .....	22
Armacost, Fortier Delhi Visit	22
Government Spokesman's Remarks	22
Comment on Jack Anderson Article, by Girilal Jain	23
Editorial Demands End to Muraroa Nuclear Tests (Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA, 25 Sep 85) .....	25
Report on AEC Chairman's Interview With 'Frontline' (N. Ram; Madras THE HINDU, 23 Sep 85) .....	27
AEC Chairman's Statement to Vienna Group Reported (Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA, 24 Sep 85) .....	29
Speeches at Nuclear Disarmament Group Seminar Reported (Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA, 23 Sep 85) .....	30



Briefs	
Kalpakkam Second Unit	31
Waste Immobilization Plant	31

## ISRAEL

Soviet Writer Describes Nation's Nuclear Program (Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, 3 Aug 85) .....	32
--	----

## PAKISTAN

Commentary Discusses Pakistan's Alleged Plan for Test in PRC (Editorial; Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 21 Oct 85) .....	42
Pakistan Said Ready To Test Nuclear Device in PRC (Moscow TASS, 30 Oct 85) .....	43
Commentary Urges Clarification of Reagan Remarks (Editorial; Lahore JANG, 27 Oct 85) .....	44
Commentary Views Reagan Remarks, Gandhi's Moscow Visit (Editorial; Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT, 28 Oct 85) .....	46
Commentary Views Gandhi's Remarks (Karachi Domestic Service, 29 Oct 85) .....	48
Minister Terms Gandhi Statements 'Baseless' (Karachi Domestic Service, 6 Nov 85) .....	49
Foreign Minister Reiterates Position on Nuclear Issue (Karachi Domestic Service, 29 Oct 85) .....	50
Commentary Views Pakistan's Assurances, U.S. Trust (Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 30 Oct 85) .....	51
Commentary Views India's 'Nuclear Leap,' Pakistan's Position (Karachi DAWN, 23 Oct 85) .....	53
India's Propaganda Motives Analyzed (N. H. Mashmey; Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 18 Oct 85) .....	55
Commentary Views Indian Allegations (Editorial; Rawalpindi HAIDAR, 21 Oct 85) .....	58
India Criticized for Nuclear Program 'Tirade' (Karachi Domestic Service, 25 Oct 85) .....	59
Alleged 'Sustained Propaganda' by India Resented (Karachi DAWN, 31 Oct 85) .....	61

Commentary Alleges India Has Bad Intentions (Editorial; Karachi MASHRIQ, 28 Oct 85) .....	62
--	----

Possible Indian Threat Viewed (Editorial; Islamabad THE MUSLIM, 28 Oct 85) .....	63
---	----

#### Briefs

Noorani on Attack Threat	64
Gandhi's Comments Reported	64
PRAVDA Cited on Test	64
Zia Reiterates Stand	65
Ziaul Haq on Israel Threat	65
Minister Alleges India Manufacturing Bomb	65

#### SYRIA

USSR Reportedly To Train Syrians on Nuclear Weapons (Kuwait KUNA, 12 Oct 85) .....	66
---	----

#### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

#### SOUTH AFRICA

New Cyclotron To Benefit Research, Industry, Medicine (Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY, 23 Oct 85) .....	67
---	----

Nuclear Power To Become Economical (Johannesburg ENGINEERING WEEK, 12 Sep 85) .....	69
--	----

JAPAN

NAKASONE DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT IN U.S. PRESS CONFERENCE

OW260449 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1700 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Press conference held by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York--live; Nakasone statements translated into English passage by passage by an official translator and questions by reporters are translated from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English by the translator; questions are provided from the English with Nakasone answers translated from the Japanese]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified moderator] We will begin the press conference of Prime Minister Nakasone.

[Nakasone] I would like to say a few words at the outset. I would like to -- on this occasion -- once again express by heartfelt gratitude for the kind support and cooperation offered by the government as well as the people of the United States of America, as well as the authorities of the United Nations during my visit here to the United States, and also to the United Nations. During my current stay here in New York, I congratulated the United Nations on its 40th anniversary and also took this opportunity to appeal to the peoples of the world about Japan's thoughts and policies. I appealed in my speech for peace and disarmament and the elimination of nuclear arsenals from the world. I also appealed that we should uphold free trade and work together hand in hand with the developing countries and promote exchange, cultural as well as in the arts, and reduce borders between countries and remove the Iron Curtain. I am most grateful that I received very strong support from the people.

At the same time, during this stay I took part in the meeting of the advanced countries, which was hosted by President Reagan. During that meeting, we once again confirmed the unity among the Western countries as we approach the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. And I sincerely hope that with this reaffirmation of our support and unity, the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting will show a strong move toward peace and disarmament in the world. Today I also had a Japan-U.S. summit meeting with President Reagan and discussed such matters as economic issues and other bilateral issues in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and friendship, and confirmed that we shall work to address these matters strongly and in an appropriate manner. I also asked for President Reagan's advice as I shall be hosting the economic summit meeting in Tokyo next year and I received his kind acceptance to come to the meeting in Tokyo. The 1-week visit this time has been indeed a very busy one but I must say that this also can be characterized as one of the most meaningful, and also historical ones in my life. And I would once again like to thank all of you for your kind cooperation.

[Unidentified moderator] We will now proceed to the question-and-answer period.

[Nasa -- TOKYO SHIMBUN] I would like to ask, Mr Prime Minister, on the basis of the achievement of your visit this time, what sort of contribution Japan on her part intends to make in terms of disarmament in the coming days. And I also would like to ask, Mr Prime Minister, how you intend to promote dialogue with the Soviet Union in the interest of reducing tension, including the possibility of you yourself visiting the Soviet Union.

[Nakasone] First, with regard to disarmament, Japan has steadfastly maintained the principle of maintaining a moderate defense capability and never again becoming a military power. This has been the major source of our ability to appeal to the world. We have heretofore maintained this principle of moderate defense capability by standing by the principle of solely defensive defense and the so-called three nonnuclear principles, and we shall maintain these principles in an appropriate manner in the coming days as well.

Having said that, our own security is essential in order to maintain our independence as well as peace. Therefore, we shall work for the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and where we should take responsibility we shall fulfill that role. However, as I said, we will maintain our defense capability with moderation so that we do not cause any concern among our neighboring countries. And in fact, up to now we have been working on our defense capabilities with due consideration for that aspect. We have through this means limited ourselves to moderate defense capability, and we have also been appealing to the outside world strongly -- since Japan is the only country that suffered the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- to reduce the levels of nuclear arsenals as much as possible toward the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons on this earth.

Now, in this respect I am gratified that many people now anticipate that as a result of the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting there now is a possibility of a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons between the two countries. To this effect, I have been expressing my thoughts directly to President Reagan and I also encouraged President Reagan to work toward that goal. I visited the Soviet Union when I attended Chernenko's funeral in March; I had a meeting with Gorbachev and I appealed to him strongly that he talk with the U.S. side in all sincerity to reduce the level of ICBM's and other nuclear weapons. Through these means and others, Japan shall seek all possible avenues for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

With regard to a nuclear test ban, our foreign minister, Mr Abe, at the United Nations made a 3-stage proposal with verification while nurturing an atmosphere of confidence, so that ultimately nuclear tests can be stopped. Japan is a country with a lot of earthquakes and therefore I believe we have advanced technology with regard to detection of nuclear explosions. Therefore we believe that we can make contributions to verification efforts. Furthermore with regard to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], the other day when I met with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and President Ziaul Haq of Pakistan, I strongly appealed to them to join the NPT. I would like to take all possible opportunities to make efforts for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and appeal for greater participation in the NPT.

[Unidentified moderator] Next question.

[Adams] I am Jacqueline Adams of CBS. I am wondering -- do you share the disappointment that has been expressed by some of your colleagues about the apparent downgrading of the issue of arms control as the United States prepared for the Geneva summit?

Also, since you said earlier that you expect substantial progress on arms control, was there something specific in your discussions with the President, perhaps the new arms control proposal that the United States was working on, that gave you the confidence that there can be substantial reductions in Geneva?

[Nakasona] First of all, let me say that I listened to President Reagan's speech at the United Nations yesterday and I felt the very positive attitude on the part of the United States with regard to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, as President Reagan goes to the summit meeting with Gorbachev, and also felt his strong determination in this regard. I am sure that many other people in the audience share the same impression. So I support, and also appreciate, such an attitude on the part of the United States.

I had two meetings with Reagan yesterday and also met with President Reagan this morning, and I was rather very much impressed by the attitude of President Reagan that at such an important time, Reagan intends to hold a candid dialogue with the Soviet Union and have mutual in-depth discussions in this direction and there is need for mutual understanding. So I was impressed by President Reagan's attitude that he will go to the meeting with Gorbachev with good faith for disarmament between the two countries.

Naturally, President Reagan did not speak to me as to what sort of specific proposals he would be making to the Soviet side. But he did tell me that depending on the proposals that Gorbachev would be putting to him, he would listen carefully to such proposals and study in them earnestly, and I hope that Reagan, in such an instance, would also indicate his reactions to such proposals.

/12858

CSO: 5160/10

NEW ZEALAND

## GREENPEACE CLAIMS GAINS AGAINST FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS

Paris Poll Cited

HK281220 Hong Kong AFP in English 1127 GMT 28 Oct 85

[Text] Auckland, New Zealand, 28 October (AFP)--The ecologist group Greenpeace said here today that its campaign off Mururoa Atoll had succeeded in delaying a new series of French nuclear tests and that a large part of the French population had begun to oppose them.

At a press conference on board the Greenpeace, which arrived in Auckland Harbour yesterday to repair a broken generator, the protest's coordinator Gerd Leipold said the tests scheduled for September did not go ahead until 24 October, despite the French Government's insistence that they would not be delayed.

He said media coverage had attracted world attention to the problem and above all had told the French what their country was doing in Mururoa.

This had won over a large number of French people to oppose the tests, he said quoting a recent opinion poll in a Paris daily which showed more than 40 percent of people questioned were against the experiments on Mururoa.

France wanted to stop the campaign by sinking the Rainbow Warrior in July, but it had not been able to sink the idea, he declared.

Delays Credited

HK280535 Wellington Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 28 Oct 85

[Text] The coordinator of Greenpeace's Mururoa campaign, (Gerd Laypole), says the campaign has had some small victories such as delaying the latest series of nuclear tests at Mururoa [word indistinct]. Speaking at a news conference in Auckland, Mr Laypole said despite these steps forward, the only day Greenpeace would claim success is the day the tests stop.

[Begin (Laypole) recording] I'm sure the tests have been delayed, and from the announcements in May after the last test series, it was to be expected that the next series would take place in the second half of September. It

was not until the second half of October when they finally started to run, and I really, I'm convinced that the presence of the peace flotilla, together with the Rainbow Warrior affair, was responsible for the delay of these tests. [end recording]

(Gerd Laypole says the presence of the yacht Vega which was arrested for entering the 12-mile limit probably delayed the first test by a number of hours.

/12913

CSO: 5100/4302

CANADA

## PLAN TO BUILD, OPERATE CANDU REACTOR IN TURKEY QUESTIONED

Vancouver THE SUN in English 23 Aug 85 p A16

[Article by Margaret Munro, SOUTHAM NEWS]

[Text]

Canada's plan to build a nuclear reactor on the edge of the Mediterranean Sea, run the operation and sell the electricity to Turkey is the oddest proposal ever to emerge from the nuclear industry.

A U.S.-Japanese business team rejected it last year as too risky, but Canadian taxpayers could soon have a \$1-billion stake in the venture.

Last week, Jim Donnelly, president of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., emerged from meetings with Turkish officials and announced Turkey would buy electricity produced at a Candu reactor, which the Canadian crown corporation has agreed to build and operate.

Canadian nuclear firms are confident there is money to be made in the unprecedented move of both building and operating a Candu, but one of their U.S. competitors is not so sure.

Westinghouse Electric Corp. and its Japanese partner dropped out of the race to sell a reactor to Turkey last fall when negotiators in that country made it clear they wanted the supplier to not only build the reactor but also to finance and run the plant for 15 years.

"It just didn't make sense from a private-enterprise perspective," James Moore, vice-president in charge of Westinghouse's reactor division, said.

"As a private corporation we weren't in a position to pick up the kind of responsibility they were after."

As for AECL's plan, Moore said: "I wish them luck."

The deal hinges on whether the Mulroney government agrees to guarantee the financing.

While AECL's critics doubt the Progressive Conservatives will go along with the "hare-brained" scheme, nu-

clear industry officials are optimistic.

"I can't see Mr. Donnelly signing a deal like this without reasonable assurance that the gov-

ernment is amenable to seeing it culminated," said Ian Wilson, vice-president of the Canadian Nuclear Association.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. hasn't said much about the deal except that it will be a boon to the Canadian economy.

The corporation estimates it will create enough work to keep 8,000 Canadian workers manufacturing reactor components for five years.

Despite repeated requests for interviews, senior AECL officials were not available to elaborate on the terms of the agreement.

The agreement signed in Ankara last week would see AECL will lead a consortium of Canadian nuclear firms building the reactor, a British company doing engineering work and a Turkish company helping with construction.

AECL will arrange \$1 billion in financing to pay for the reactor and operate the facility for 15 years. The corporation plans to recoup its investment by selling the electricity from the reactor to Turkey at competitive rates. Turkey will assume ownership of the plant after 15 years.

AECL public-affairs officer Denis St-Jean did not know, and would not find out, how Turkey plans to regulate the reactor, which will be outside the jurisdiction of Canada's nuclear watchdog agency, the Atomic Energy Control Board.

Nor would St-Jean find out if the Canadian government, and ultimately Canadian taxpayers, would be financially liable for damages in the event of a nuclear accident — saying the question was "too hypothetical."

He also played down the possibility of financial problems if the reactor failed and could not produce electricity as expected.



CANADA

U.S. DECISION TO KEEP STORAGE SITES AWAY FROM BORDER NOTED

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 12 Sep 85 p 5

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — Federal Energy Minister Pat Carney won assurances from U.S. Energy Secretary John Herrington yesterday that the Americans will not build nuclear-waste storage sites along the Canadian border.

The United States will build five disposal sites, in Utah, Texas, Mississippi, Nevada and Washington state, Mr. Herrington told a news conference at the end of a day of wide-ranging bilateral talks with Miss Carney.

The sites will be ready by 1988, but none will be located near the border or any populated areas, Mr. Herrington said.

The issue has been a sore point since the United States announced earlier this year that it was considering storing nuclear materials at Holland Pond, Vt., near the Eastern Townships region of Quebec.

Canada protested against the proposed location because it feared nuclear waste could seep into the water supplies of the Quebec towns of Beebe and Stanstead, located just above the Vermont border.

The United States has drawn up a list of 250 potential locations to choose from when the five new sites are filled, but Mr. Herrington indicated that Canadian concerns will be taken into account.

"We will be very sensitive where these sites are going and how they are developed," he said.

Earlier, Mr. Herrington visited the House of Commons chamber and watched from the visitors' gallery as New Democratic energy critic Ian Waddell warned Miss Carney not to get locked into any discussion of a continental energy policy involving Canada, Mexico and the United States.

CSO: 5120/24

CANADA

PHYSICIANS URGED TO JOIN FIGHT AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Vancouver THE SUN in English 13 Sep 85 p C9

[Text]

While most Canadians and their politicians haven't realized the importance of controlling nuclear weapons, a doctors' movement is making progress in alleviating ignorance and disinterest, Dr. Thomas Perry Jr. said Thursday.

But Dr. Perry pleaded for a more active role by all doctors to prevent nuclear war.

In a paper presented to a symposium at the annual meeting of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, Dr. Perry said physicians "must take a leading role in preventing nuclear war because they have the knowledge to understand its effects and the communication skills to convey them to the public."

Although fewer than 25 doctors — out of 2,500 attending the week-long annual meeting of the college in Vancouver — attended the symposium, Dr. Perry said great strides had been made recently.

"I believe there is good evidence that the physicians' movement has had a major impact on the thinking of our politicians," Dr. Perry said in his paper. "Recently, presentations by PSR (and other organizations in Vancouver last July) appear to have had a key role in persuading a special parliamentary committee and the government to resist the naive and dangerous allure of SDI (Star Wars)."

CSO: 5120/24

CANADA

VIEWS MIXED ON SCRAPPING DARLINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 12 Sep 85 p A5

[Text]

**TORONTO (CP) —** Scrapping Ontario Hydro's massive Darlington nuclear power plant would be almost impossible because the utility has already committed \$7 billion to the unfinished project, Premier David Peterson said Wednesday.

Peterson, who during his years as opposition leader often called for the cancellation of the huge project, told reporters so much money has been put into the project that shutting it down would be "extremely difficult" and could cause disastrous financial repercussions.

"It's difficult to do that (scrap the project) when \$7 billion has been committed. If only \$1 billion

had been committed and there was \$9 billion to go, it would have been a different situation."

The future of the partly completed \$10.9-billion project just east of Oshawa is one of the issues being tackled by an all-party-committee set up as part of the Liberal-NDP agreement that led to the defeat of the minority Conservative government.

Saying the plant will provide a massive supply of electricity Ontario doesn't need, New Democrats on the committee have demanded the project be scrapped. Tories, on the other hand, insist it go ahead while the Liberals are studying whether it is too late to pull the plug.

CSO: 5120/24

CANADA

## LONDON NUCLEAR ROLE IN CLEANING REACTORS DISCUSSED

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 30 Aug 85 p B13

[Article by Thomas Claridge]

[Text]

London Nuclear Ltd., a small Ontario company, has quietly emerged as a world leader in decontamination of nuclear power reactors.

Eric LeSurf, a soft-spoken nuclear scientist who is the company's president, said London Nuclear's achievements are a result of close co-operation between Canada's public and private sectors.

The company was formed in 1977 by W. P. London and Associates Ltd., a Niagara Falls, Ont., firm of consulting engineers, after approaches by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

Mr. LeSurf was a member of an AECL research team that had developed and successfully demonstrated a decontamination system for the Candu reactor. He was hired away from AECL after the London company decided to take on the challenge of marketing the so-called Candecon process internationally.

Mr. LeSurf said AECL got a head start

in the decontamination field because of a discovery about 1969 that radiation fields in the first commercial-scale Candu reactor, at the Douglas Point Generating Station near Kincardine, Ont., were well above predicted levels.

Although several decontamination systems were being marketed in the United States and elsewhere, none appeared well-suited for the Canadian reactor design, which involves moving heavy water at high pressure within carbon-steel piping.

Mr. LeSurf said all decontamination processes then being marketed involved use of relatively strong chemicals and a fill-and-drain arrangement that required removal of both fuel and coolant from the reactor and the creation of large volumes of highly radioactive chemical wastes.

Such processes were inappropriate in the Canadian design because of the costliness of heavy water and the

need to maintain its purity at levels above 99 per cent. They also involved creation of high volumes of radioactive wastes.

The challenge researchers from AECL and Ontario Hydro faced was to come up with a system that would work effectively without the reactor being drained or its fuel removed. It also had to use a chemical that wasn't overly corrosive to carbon steel.

The Candecon process involves repeated cycling of a mildly acidic solution — with 0.1 per cent concentrations of the active agent in place of the 10 per cent concentrations common in the earlier U.S. processes.

Mr. LeSurf said the agent takes up the metal ions of contaminants and with them their radioactivity. Then, passage of the solution through ion exchange columns results in the agents being regenerated and the contaminants becoming bound up in resins.

"As a result, the same amount of 're-agent' is available an infinite number of times, with the waste being transferred to the resins," Mr. LeSurf said, "and it all can be done in heavy water while producing a relatively small volume of waste."

The process was tried for a first time at the Douglas Point plant in 1975. It was deemed a great success, with radiation fields in some cases being cut to 10 per cent of previous levels.

The next major need for the Candecon process in Canada didn't come about until last year, when Ontario Hydro decided to replace all 780 pressure tubes in the two oldest reactors at its Pickering Generating Station.

Mr. LeSurf said that as word on the success of the Douglas Point

decontamination spread, utilities in the United States and elsewhere started to ask AECL how the process would work on the two U.S. reactor designs, the pressurized (light) water reactor (PWR) and the boiling-water reactor (BWR).

In 1977, the federal agency signed a licensing agreement with W. P. London and Associates, who then established London Nuclear Ltd. and a U.S. subsidiary, London Nuclear Services Inc.

In the intervening eight years, the process has been used to decontaminate reactor systems in the United States, France and Japan. "Our more than 30 successful decontaminations in the States is more than all our competitors' added together," Mr. LeSurf said.

BULGARIA

## PROGRESS REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION OF 1,000 MW NUCLEAR UNIT

### New Technological Successes Reported

Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 3 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Katya Yaneva: "The Longest Week at the 5th Power Block"]

[Text] The days from 31 August to 9 September, united by the initially absurd-sounding concept of the "longest week in the history of building the 5th power block at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Complex," will go down in history in regard to our power supply policy. And yet what seems absurd is cancelled out by practice, which has its own special calendar. It is different from the yearly one, which is guided by the weather needed to carry out a given operation. In this case we are talking about installing the cupola of the reaction section, which will be completed in the days just before the ninth of September.

In the early hours of 31 August, the brigade of hero of socialist labor Dimitur Petrov wove together the last patterns of a complex piece of "lace," the cupola's reinforcing screen. Now the last word belongs to the fitters from the N.Y. Vaptsarov brigade.

"Everything depends on today," says brigade leader Ivan Lichev, also a hero of socialist labor. "If we succeed in "unsticking" the screen from the cupola, this will open up a front for working, and in three to four days we will be able to put it into place."

This will mark the end of a truly unique construction operation. For the first time a cupola for a 1,000 mw reactor will be mounted in one piece. What is new is the technology for installing a reinforcing screen. Up to now this has been woven above the cupola. But the Bulgarian builders are proposing their own variant: working this out on the ground (as well as the cupola itself), and after dividing it into parts, putting it over the cupola. The effect can be described in two words: speed and precision in the installation.

At 6:30 p.m. the 240-ton screen is in the air. It can already be called the guarantee of a successful conclusion to this longest week in the construction of the 5th power block.

Perhaps it is too early for congratulations. Not everything has been done yet. But the Bulgarian builders already have the self-confidence of people who have already demonstrated their right to stand alongside those whose unique construction projects have already become a tradition. And they themselves are creating traditions.

Perhaps it is still too early to be totalling up the accounts, but here this has already been done, and not for the past but for the future. People are speaking quite frequently about the date 30 June 1988, the start-up date for the 6th power block.

"No matter how similar the sites are," reported the head of construction Dimitur Dinkov, "we have to adapt to the conditions of the given site, the given work space. While we were building the 5th power block, we adapted ourselves to Bulgarian conditions. With the 6th, we are adapting ourselves to the shortened deadlines (we are figuring that we will have one-quarter the amount of time for this than we had for the 5th). Thus we are analyzing everything positively and negatively. Several very good ideas came into being at the 5th power block: enlarged installation of many of the parts, rapid construction of the hermetic zone in a open way, construction of the moldings for the cupola with hoops. But for good reason not everything was at a level which corresponds to the complexity of the site. The underground communication system was not completed on time. Carried away by the deadlines, we rushed the construction sector: we sealed off the levels and left many jobs to be completed under difficult conditions. In this way we lost time.

"A great difficulty was the lack of cadres, and the average training was less than what was required. All of this forced us to seek new technological, organizational, and technical resolutions. Their basic goal was to use maximally the possibilities offered by the construction technology we have at hand. In regard to technology, this meant not installing small parts and junctions, but rather preparing heavy installation blocks, of 250 to 300 tons each, which could be lifted into place with a crane."

What is original in these new technological developments? Undoubtedly this is the open method of construction: the construction and installation operations are carried out at the same time, and the levels are sealed off only after all of the equipment is placed there. This will save a lot of trouble in terms of bringing in huge equipment, as well as many laborious finishing jobs.

This new technology dictates a new organization for the work: the engineering preparation and the fitting of pieces will take place one to two levels above the course of the installation itself.

The builders of the 6th power block are still at ground level. Its construction will be no less difficult. But the path from level zero to the cupola will follow along a new way of self-confidence.

And its starting place is the work site of the 5th power block, there where for months in a row builders have been fashioning thoughts and inspiration in order to show themselves.

# Workers Responsible for Installing Cupola

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 5 Sep 85 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Success of the Kozloduy Builders"]

[Text] Twelve years ago today, on the shore of the Danube near Kozloduy, the festive opening of our first nuclear reactor took place. This memorable event now coincides with a new working victory for the builders of the 5th power block. With their excellent organization and exemplary way of working, the 300-ton cupola, which will cover the reactor section was lifted off the ground in the morning to the necessary height. In the course of two months of installing it, experienced builders worked tirelessly. These include workers from the metal construction brigade of hero of socialist labor Ivan Lichev and reinforcing fitters led by hero of socialist labor Dimitur Petrov. Great contributions to the technical preparation of the equipment were made by engineers Chavdar Petrov, Iliyan Iliev, Chavdar Savov, technical leader Georgi Ivanov, and dozens of others. The development of the unique construction used for the first time in our country is the work of a group of Soviet specialists, headed by engineer Stanislav Ivanovich Pasyuta and Boris Stepanovich Fenik, with the active participation of a Bulgarian group dealing with engineering preparation of the site.

The operation of lifting the cupola was carried out by a specialized group, with brigade leader Min'o Georgiev and his assistant Lyuben Yanachkov, and lasted more than three hours. The workers at the 5th power block dedicated their success to the bright anniversary of freedom on the Ninth of September.

[Caption] The pre-holiday success of the Kozloduy builders: the huge 300 ton cupola of the reaction section of the 5th power block.

## Story of Cupola's Raising Recounted

Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 5 Sep 85 pp 1,2

[Article by Vasil Pavlov: "An Excellent Mark for a Test of Courage"]

[Text] Here, at the site of expansion for the first nuclear power plant, each day is noted by changes, but yesterday will long be remembered by the builders. They affirm it themselves. And truly it is a rare opportunity to see the raising and installation of such a complex and huge piece of equipment as the cupola of a 1,000 mw block. In Bulgaria at least this is happening for the first time. A novelty in constructing such pieces of equipment was the technology that was applied: the cupola was "assembled" down on the ground, and the same took place with the reinforcing. This was accompanied by the self-denial and audacity of brigades led by hero of socialist labor Ivan Lichev and Dimitur Petrov, which allowed the work to be completed in the shortest possible time.

Again we will return to the efforts made by day and night by the builders, which led to this success of labor, but our attention is gripped by the final



preparations: precision in the stages of lifting, checking that the operation will be carried out safely, as well as everyone's tension and excitement. The only exception here is Ivan Lichev. On the outside at least he is calm, he gives orders, he stays in radio contact with the crane operator. We look at our watches. It is 9:37 a.m. The huge Demag crane (the only one with its capacity in Europe) shudders, and the piece is "unstuck" from the ground. Stop! The final checks are made, including the automatic measurements of the crane. The overall weight (without the reinforcement) is 294 tons. "Well, everything is in order," we hear from a group of Soviet specialists. We take advantage of the moment.

"Yes, I am calm," Ivan Lichev divides his attention, "as far as I know, everything so far has been carried as it should be, including strict maintenance of the equipment and documentation, as well as high quality in the operations completed. We knew how much it would cost to keep to these schedules, but it was necessary. So we promised that in honor of the Ninth of September victory, we would have the cupola in place. The reinforcing fitters of Dimitur Petrov, some of the finest I have worked with, also understood their worthy part in keeping to this promise.

"Just as we said we would, we made good on our promise. We not only did what we promised, we finished the work five days early. And now at this site, where there has been such exceptional tension for months . . . But there is no time for emotions. The radio link prompts us to a new direction. We rush over to the crane. The crane operators are often left standing in the shadows. But where would we be without them?"

"There is some truth to that," agrees Min'o Yordanov, one of the four operators of the mightiest crane on the continent. "And you write about it, the crane. It is ours, the dream, of all operators."

After this we are invited to the cabin to see from there, to feel what it is like, to talk about this difficult and responsible position. And it truly is. They help almost all the brigades; everyone's results depend on its safe operation.

The radio crackles with a new command: "Lift!" "Good luck!" This good luck wish merges with the sound of a smashed bottle of champagne. The time is 9:55. The cupola takes up its permanent place of residence. We say good luck and we experience a strange, superstitious shudder, we pray in our thoughts to someone, so that everything will go smoothly. And there is a reason for this. Especially after Min'o Yordanov explains to us that the piece will be lifted to a height of 66 meters, and if a wind springs up with a speed greater than two meters per second, everything would have to be returned to the starting position and everything would begin again at a more propitious time. That is why we were praying -- so that everything would indeed go well!

. . . And it does. Two and a half hours later the cupola "Stands" on the molding of the reactor section. Its installation begins. Afterwards the

reinforcing network, as well as additional parts and pieces, will be raised and installed. But one of the most difficult operations of this expansion process is already history. A new, glorious page has been written in the story of Bulgarian construction and in particular of those people who passed their test with flying colors.

12929/12334

CSO: 5100/3041

BRAZIL

MINISTER CHAVES REACTS TO U.S. SENATOR'S REMARKS

PY290250 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 25 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] Mines and Energy Minister Aureliano Chaves yesterday stated that U.S. Senator Alan Cranston has shown that he is misinformed by saying that the PRC is exporting nuclear technology to Brazil, because the Brazilian nuclear program is strictly peaceful. The minister added that all nuclear accords signed so far with the FRG, Argentina, and the PRC, among others, are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to ensure their peaceful and nonmilitary purposes.

Aureliano Chaves refused to comment on any applications that these accords may have in the military field: "If there is a Brazilian program to build an atomic bomb, questions about it must be addressed to the military ministers, who are the only ones who can answer them."

U.S. Senator Alan Cranston had mentioned the "Brazilian-PRC nuclear trade" as an example of the lack of cooperation with the U.S. policy of nuclear nonproliferation, because according to Cranston, Brazil "is a country with high ambitions in the nuclear field and aspires to become a superpower."

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CSO: 5100/2009

BRAZIL

PRC REACTS TO U.S. SENATOR'S STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS

PY2502236 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 24 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] Brasilia -- PRC diplomats accredited in Brasilia yesterday expressed disbelief at the statements by U.S. Senator Alan Cranston that the PRC is exporting nuclear technology to several countries, including Brazil, for military purposes. According to the diplomats, who asked not to be identified, the PRC's agreements with other nations have peaceful purposes and, in the case of Brazil, the documents signed by former President Figueiredo in 1984 thus far have had no practical results. That is, they remain just a letter of intent [acordo de intencao] on nuclear cooperation.

However, the diplomats did not rule out the possibility that this matter will again be raised when Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visits Brasilia on 30 October. Accompanied by an entourage of more than 100 persons -- among them, several ministers of state -- Zhao will stay 6 days in Brazil. He will be willing to hold additional talks with Brazilian businessmen to increase trade between the two countries. The presence of Mrs Chen Muhua, a councilor of state and the chairman of the Bank of China, in Zhao's entourage is interpreted as proof of the PRC's interest. It is also being said that the interests of the two countries in the field of aeronautics and space research coincide.

In the opinion of the Chinese diplomats, the statements by the U.S. senator are just "specualtions," and they gave as an example Cranston's listing of South Africa as one of the countries that import nuclear technology from the PRC.

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CSO: 5100/2008

BRAZIL

RELATIONS, PLANS FOR AGREEMENTS WITH PRC REVIEWED

PY301250 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0210 GMT 30 Oct 85

[By Francisco Roque Bacarreza]

[Text] Brasilia, 29 Oct (EFE) -- Official sources in Brasilia have told EFE in confidence that Brazil will give priority to its relations with the PRC before going ahead with its plan to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba. This information was leaked the day before PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang is expected to arrive in this country. Zhao will carry out an official visit between 30 October and 5 November within the framework of a four-nation Latin American tour.

The importance that Brazil is assigning Zhao's visit was reflected today in President Jose Sarney's decision to personally meet the Chinese visitor at the airport, this breaking the very strict Brazilian protocol.

Sources consulted by EFE have explained that Brazil and the PRC will try to make the two most developed economies of the so-called Third World complement each other. The plans that are to be developed with the PRC include nuclear cooperation, cultural cooperation and the development of space experiments. These plans have been given a higher priority than the resuming of diplomatic relations with Havana.

Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1964, accusing it of interfering in Brazil's internal affairs. According to Planalto Palace (Government House) sources, relations with Cuba will be resumed in the near future.

Brazilian-Chinese working groups are carefully drafting the agreements that Zhao Ziyang and Brazilian Foreign Minister Olavo Setubal will sign before the end of the week. The natural expansion of bilateral trade through the interesting modus operandi of barter and aerospace and military cooperation are among the important agreements that are to be signed. Other indications of the evident bilateral interest in strengthening ties is to be found in the opening of a PRC consulate in Sao Paulo and a Brazilian consulate in Shanghai, in addition to the naming of cultural attaches.

Trade statistics indicate that Brazil is the PRC's major Latin American customer. Brazil and the PRC established diplomatic relations in August 1974 and during these 11 years, bilateral trade has had an accelerated growth. In 1974, bilateral trade amounted to \$818,426,000, and between January and August 1984 it amounted to \$508,303,000, a 105.3 percent increase when compared with the same period in 1984.

Within the field of military strategy, the Chinese are interested in the progress of Brazil's aeronautics sector, armored land vehicles, and missile launchers, while Brazil is interested in aerospace cooperation and scientific and technological progress.

Diplomatic observers in Brasilia believe that if agreements being secretly drafted are implemented, then the two largest nations in the developing world will implement a period of cooperation which has no precedent, and which goes above and beyond ideological frontiers.

Sarney will meet with Zhao on 31 October and 1 November. He will also meet with State Council member Chen Muhua, one of the few women members of the PRC's leadership, who will sign bilateral agreements with her Brazilian colleague [as received], Olava Setubal.

Zhao is visiting Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. The Chinese entourage is expected in Brasilia on the night of 30 October.

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CSO: 5100/2011

BRAZIL

BRIEFS

STF ON NUCLEAR LAWS--The Federal Supreme Court [STF] has ruled that no state government can pass laws regarding the construction of nuclear plants. In a decision, the STF has declared Law 785/84, issued by the Rio de Janeiro State Government, unconstitutional and has ruled that it is the exclusive power of the federal government to pass laws on the construction of nuclear plants. The STF decision has made it clear that only the federal government can legislate on nuclear energy, electrical power, thermal power, or other sources of energy. [Text] [Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 5 Nov 85]

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CSO: 5100/2014

INDIA

PAPERS REPORT U.S. REGIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Armacost, Fortier Delhi Visit

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 18 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, September 17.

THE United States has urged India to consider "regional initiatives" to avert nuclear competition in the sub-continent.

Two senior American officials, who had held discussions with the foreign secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, yesterday, called on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi today. They discussed this issue in response to India expressing its deep concern over Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

India had asked the U.S. to monitor Pakistan's nuclear programme to ensure that it did not acquire the weapons capability.

The U.S. approach, as reflected in its suggestion for regional initiatives, however, differs from the Indian perception since it seeks to equate India

and Pakistan despite the fact that India abstained from the nuclear weapons option after demonstrating its capability more than a decade ago.

The U.S. suggestion also gives the impression that the Reagan administration has begun to take note of Pakistan's weapon programme, so well documented by foreign journals and TV networks, only after India's response became strident and the talk of India keeping its nuclear option open gathered momentum.

The suggestion also implies that there is a competition between India and Pakistan in the nuclear field, an argument which the former does not accept.

The so-called regional initiative may presumably involve mutual inspection of nuclear facilities and not so foolproof measures. It can also create a false sense of complacency even as Pakistan intensifies its clandestine op-

erations.

Under the circumstances, India can hardly consider the U.S. response to be satisfactory. Since the two U.S. officials left for Islamabad for talks, it expects the U.S. to take up the issue with Pakistani leaders in an effective manner.

The two officials, Mr. Michael Armacost, under secretary of state for political affairs, and Mr. Donald Fortier, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs, also met Mr. Arun Singh, parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister, before leaving.

According to the U.S. embassy here, the two officials "urged the Indian side to consider regional initiatives to avert nuclear competition in the subcontinent during a discussion on "south Asian nuclear developments."

Government Spokesman's Remarks

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 19 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

India has rejected Washington's unsolicited advice to reach agreement with Pakistan against nuclear weapons, and has stressed that the US should use its considerable clout to prevent Islamabad from acquiring nuclear capability.

The suggestion made by two senior aides of President Ronald Reagan that India should take the initiative for a regional accord to prevent a nuclear race has provoked strong reaction in the

Capital.

It is felt that the US is making a highly objectionable insinuation against India even as it disowns its own responsibility of monitoring the Pakistani nuclear programme which is patently geared towards making a nuclear bomb.

There is no way, diplomatic sources say, that the US can get away from this responsibility to preventing the Zia regime from acquiring nuclear capability.



The official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry stressed the real need in the regional nuclear scenario was to ensure that Pakistan does not acquire nuclear weapon capability.

"India is committed not to produce nuclear weapons; if it can be ensured that Pakistan too becomes committed to this — and the US can assist in this — then where is the need of a regional agreement", the spokesman said.

There is also a growing suspicion in the Capital that the US wants to use

this opportunity to twist India's arm to change its steadfast policy of not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as it now stands.

Washington has used every possible occasion to press India to sign the agreement. India has, however, said the NPT is not fair to non-nuclear weapon states. While it seeks to prevent a horizontal proliferation of weapons, it is blind to the nuclear weapon states enhancing their weapon stocks.

### Comment on Jack Anderson Article

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 18 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by Girilal Jain]

[Text]

THE well-known columnist Jack Anderson, who was the first person to tell us of the Nixon-Kissinger decision to "tilt" towards Pakistan at the time of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, has now disclosed that the Reagan administration may be beginning to "tilt" towards India.

If this in fact happens, it will be a development of the greatest importance for Asia. Naturally we have to wait for developments to unfold themselves before we can assess the magnitude of the supposed tilt and its importance, for good or ill, for us. Meanwhile let us examine its possibility. The prospect does not appear all that hopeful.

Judging by the available PTI summary, Jack Anderson and his collaborator Joseph Spear have given mainly a negative reason for the possible shift in America's South Asia policy in India's favour — disillusionment with General Zia-ul-Haq — and they have cited three reasons for this disenchantment.

First, the "U.S. conservatives' ardour for General Zia was based on the belief that he was a reliable anti-Soviet ally. It cooled when they realised that he was an Islamic fundamentalist determined to take the country down this road and stirred serious opposition among his countrymen". Secondly, the American policy-makers were unhappy over his cavalier disregard of their concern over his determination to build an "Islamic nuclear bomb." Finally, "Zia's decision to clap Bhutto's daughter under house arrest, demonstrating his fear of popular opposition after more than a decade

of dictatorship, may prove to have been the last straw."

It is difficult to believe that the first factor — General Zia's Islamic fundamentalism — can be, or is, a matter of serious concern for the Reagan administration which itself has been keen on bringing religion into the public realm. Witness its desire to make prayer compulsory in schools and its opposition to abortion. Moreover, Gen. Zia's fundamentalism is not of such a virulent type as would provoke strong reaction in the United States. The opposition to it in Pakistan also has been rather muted. Moreover, while Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, America's current obsession is with Shia radicalism emanating from Khomeini's Iran.

### Benazir's House Arrest

The third factor — Benazir Bhutto's house arrest — too cannot be a matter of such fundamental interest to the Reagan administration as to provoke it to revise drastically its South Asia policy. It is possible that it had taken a more hopeful view of General Zia's phoney elections and formation of a so-called government headed by Mr. Mohammed Khan Junejo in Islamabad last March. In that case Benazir's house arrest could have come as somewhat of a shock to it. But in the context of the deep and extensive U.S. involvement with the Afghan mujahideen in their anti-Kabul crusade, its principal interest in Pakistan must be in stability and not in a transition to democracy which could be quite unsettling and difficult to manage.

This leaves General Zia's "Islamic bomb" as the only possible provocation for a shift in America's South Asia policy. But two points deserve attention in this regard. First, the "Islamic bomb" is not a new development; it antedates the Reagan administration's decision in 1980 to extend military-cum-economic assistance to Pakistan; it had then even waived the Symington amendment which rules out U.S. aid to any country which is trying to develop nuclear weapons; the considerations that persuaded it to do so have not changed. Secondly, the Americans have been blaming New Delhi as much for Pakistan's nuclear effort as Islamabad and urging India to sign the non-proliferation treaty so that Pakistan could also be persuaded to follow suit, or alternatively to agree to a mutual inspection arrangement with the latter.

Thus we do not find the Anderson — Spear case particularly strong and convincing. In our view, the specific evidence they have cited is also rather weak. While the U.S. refusal to provide E2 Hawkeye radar system to Pakistan is doubtless a gesture of goodwill towards India, it is not an anti-Pakistan move as such. Indeed, to put the matter more appropriately, a decision to provide Hawkeyes to Pakistan would have been tantamount to a declaration that the Reagan administration was anti-India to the point of being willing to tilt the power balance in the air decisively against it and in Pakistan's favour. So by refraining from such a decision, Washington has only shown that it cares for India's

interests and susceptibilities at least to that extent. This fits in with the administration's new interest in improved relations with this country.

### Interesting Coincidence

It is, of course, a sheer coincidence that the Anderson-Spear column should have been followed by a report in *The New York Times* that Mr. Armiacost, under secretary of state, and Mr. Fortier, deputy assistant to President Reagan for national security affairs, were being sent to New Delhi (they have since held discussions in the Indian capital) and Islamabad to express anxiety about the development of a nuclear weapon by Pakistan and possible retaliation by India in a manner similar to the Israeli strike against an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. But it is an interesting coincidence which illuminates the American approach to the issue of non-proliferation in South Asia. For the report quotes U.S. officials making two points.

First, though India has always resisted being equated with Pakistan, one option to be considered is agreement between the two countries permitting mutual inspection as urged by Pakistan. Secondly, the mood in the administration is to "get involved" and "weigh in" to avert a confrontation between India and Pakistan. In 1963 too the U.S. and Britain "got involved" and "weighed in" to "resolve" the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of Chinese aggression against India. Pakistan was then threatening to make common cause with China; now it is threatening to make the bomb. The threat was indirect then; it is indirect now.

It is hardly necessary to recall that the government of India has said more than once that it has no plans to engage in an Israeli-type pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's key nuclear installations at Kahuta near

Peshawar. It is equally unnecessary to recall that, unlike Iraq's, Pakistan's nuclear facilities are located in hardened underground sites which India cannot bomb out of existence even if it was so inclined. Moreover, unlike Iraq vis-a-vis Israel, Pakistan vis-a-vis India is not a sitting duck. It can retaliate and attempt to bomb either oil or nuclear installations. These are within the range of its F-16s.

Clearly there is a purpose in American attempts to conjure the unlikely scenario of India attempting an Israeli-style pre-emptive strike on Pakistani nuclear installations. Indeed, this purpose is self-evident. It is to compel India to sign the NPT or a mutual inspection agreement with Pakistan. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's numerous statements could have aroused the hope in Washington that it is possible to push India in that direction.

### The Two Refrains

On the eve of his visit to the United States last June, Mr. Gandhi was quoted as having said in Paris that India might be willing to sign the NPT. A day later he denied having made such a statement. For us in India, that was the end of the matter. But perhaps that was not so for the Americans. They could have concluded that opposition to the NPT was not an issue of principle with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi as it was with his predecessor, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and that he could be brought round with the help of a proper mix of threat (the Pakistani bomb) and inducement (offer of sophisticated weapons to India and denial of Hawkeyes to Pakistan). Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has made a number of other statements on the issue of the Pakistani bomb. Two refrains run through these statements. First, that Islamabad's determined bid to acquire nuclear weapons has become

the biggest obstacle in the path of improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Secondly, that the United States has not done all it could to stop General Zia in his tracks. This stance is quite different from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's. She was more concerned with Pakistan's alleged aid to Sikh extremists and America's military supplies to Pakistan.

The implications of the Prime Minister's statements are obvious. If Islamabad's nuclear efforts are the biggest obstacle in the way of improved Indo-Pakistani ties and if it is desirable that these relations improve, it must be in India's own interest to do all it can to persuade Pakistan to give these up. And we know Pakistan's price. Either we sign the NPT or conclude a mutual inspection agreement with it.

Similarly, if it is our case that U.S. has not done all it could in the matter, we must, again in our own interest, persuade it to use fully its influence in Islamabad. Again we know the price. It is the same as in the first case.

From the American point of view, it is not an unreasonable proposition; we must be willing to give up our nuclear option if we want them to persuade Pakistan to give up its. In view of all this, can it be a matter of great surprise if the Americans have come to feel that a supposed "tilt" towards India can win them a lot, including the Indian signature on the NPT?

We need to be careful. Good Indo-U.S. relations, to be durable, must rest on mutuality of interests. Such a mutuality of interests, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be spelt out. But it can be asserted that a sensible definition cannot involve a tilt on the part of either country. Mature leaders do not think and speak in terms of tilts. They think and speak in terms of mutuality of interests and mutual adjustments.

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CSO: 5150/0003

INDIA

EDITORIAL DEMANDS END TO MURUROA NUCLEAR TESTS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 25 Sep 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Mururoa Tests Must Stop"]

[Text]

Thanks to exposures by the press, especially *Le Monde*, the French government has been compelled to admit its guilt in sinking the environmental group Greenpeace's protest ship, the *Rainbow Warrior*, in Auckland last July. But it has done so in a characteristically awkward and half-hearted manner, and three days after the resignation of the defence minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, and the dismissal of the secret service (DGSE) chief, Mr. Pierre Lacoste. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Laurent Fabius, has now told the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. David Lange, that he is "truly sorry" about the effect the Greenpeace affair has had on relations between the two countries. He has also confirmed that it was DGSE agents acting "on orders" who sank the ship. However, an official spokesman has refused to say if the message to Washington constitutes an apology of the kind Mr. Lange has been demanding from France for committing a "sordid act of state-backed international terrorism." Mr. Fabius has also chosen to condone the criminal acts of DGSE agents who blew up the ship which was on a mission of protest against French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific ocean. He has stated that "the simple executors (of the DGSE plan) obviously must be exonerated because it would be unacceptable to expose military men who only obeyed orders."

This is the conventional approach. Another government in a similar embarrassment would have taken a similar position. But it cannot dispose of other problems. In the first place, France had no business carrying out dangerous nuclear tests in the Pacific. And sending DGSE agents to a sovereign state to sink a ship and kill a journalist on board is tantamount to international brigandage. Mr. Lange has rightly termed Mr. Fabius' statement as "a remarkable interpretation of international law" and insisted on a formal apology as well as full compensation from France. Meanwhile, Australia has also demanded a full apology. And at home the right-wing opposition to Mr. Mitterrand is mounting. Evidently, the French President is now caught in a cleft-stick with the parliamentary elections only six months away. Regardless of whether Mr. Mitterrand or Mr. Fabius was involved in making decisions

pertaining to the shameful affair, their Socialist party is bound to have to pay a heavy political price for it. There is only one morally acceptable way out now for Mr. Mitterrand. He should stop all nuclear tests in France's Polynesian colonies. These tests have caused untold ecological devastation and their fallout has apparently produced incurable tumours and other fatal health effects among islanders living nearby. As the Polynesian independence movement has demanded, France should conduct such tests at home: it has no business poisoning people in the third world.

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CSO: 5150/0009

INDIA

REPORT ON AEC CHAIRMAN'S INTERVIEW WITH 'FRONTLINE'

Madras THE HINDU in English 23 Sep 85 p 9

[Article by N. Ram]

[Text]

BOMBAY, Sept. 22.

Dr. Raja Ramanna, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has highlighted the significance of the fast breeder test reactor in Kalpakkam for the future of the Indian programme. "It is a very important experiment from the point of view of economics, breeding technology and the future of reactors. So the input is tremendous once the FBTR goes into operation."

The fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam is scheduled for commissioning in October.

Dr. Ramanna's remarks came in a wide-ranging interview with *Frontline* that is being carried in the new issue.

He expressed satisfaction over the overall progress of the nuclear energy programme. "Success not in the sense that we are producing lots of power which some other countries have done, but success in the sense that we are deeply rooted in our own soil in the development of atomic energy."

**Good job on the whole:** Asked to sum up the three-and-a-half decade experience with which he has been associated from the start, the distinguished physicist and head of the atomic energy establishment said: "Oh, when we started, we had so much enthusiasm and wanted to do so many things ... I think we progressed fast. Then there was a period, a difficult period that came and we had quite a few knocks—which was necessary to give us some maturity. Having survived this, one can look back on the programme with satisfaction. I think that under the circumstances and the financial constraints—the country itself hasn't done badly. Atomic energy has done much better because we inherited a good system, thanks to Bhabha."

Asked to assess the significance of three aspects of the atomic energy programme, represented by the 100 MW reactor Dhruva on the research side, by the Kalpakkam atomic power station on the power side, and by the fast breeder test reactor on the future side, Dr. Ramanna underlined the soundness of the direction and the self-reliant thrust of the programme.

**Totally indigenous:** "Dhruva was planned because you must have a reactor to produce isotopes and produce neutrons for basic and engineering research ... Cirus is an excellent reactor and works very steadily. But all things must come to an end. (Dhruva) is a replacement and naturally, after 25 years, we put up a bigger reactor ... But the great thing about Dhruva is since nobody will give you designs for such reactors, we did the designing and decided on the materials for construction ourselves... For many long years, we had forgotten to take bold decisions, now this has broken that kind of hesitancy on our part. With Dhruva critical, new technological knowledge becomes available to the country. Nobody can stop us and ... there's been no help whatever from outside."

As for Kalpakkam, he noted that MAPP-II "is an improved version of MAPP-I. And if it works steadily, at a good capacity factor like MAPP-I, I think we would have achieved something significant." About the positive indicators of Kalpakkam's performance, he joked: "Madras has almost worked too well. People don't believe it has achieved such a high capacity factor and if at times we have had to have a shut down, it was because of the vibration of the generator system (purely electrical engineering)."

**FBTR's importance:** About the small fast breeder test reactor getting ready for commissioning at Kalpakkam, he observed: "But FBTR is a different matter. That takes us into the very few, an elite group—some countries are still thinking of whether they should or should not go into the fast breeder programme ... I feel that countries abroad didn't quite expect that we would finish the FBTR by ourselves."

Dr. Ramanna was strongly critical of the discriminatory approach to nuclear non-proliferation in the international arena. "I think the consistency with which we have applied safeguards is remarkable when you look at some of the older correspondence on the subject ... We made it clear that we would accept the safeguards in the first instance, because we hoped that eventually the big powers would also

come to some kind of disarmament ... Well, safeguards on materials have gone on and they have been increasing but the other part relating to disarmament has never been completed ... Today they say, "no, no, safeguards apply to all the equipment that goes with it," and has pursued—if you take a small screw and put it somewhere else, that also comes under safeguards." This almost sounds like trying to restrict nuclear programmes in peaceful countries, and not really move the whole world towards disarmament. They also say at the same time that only some countries should be armed with nuclear weapons."

The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission characterised the demand for fullscope safeguards—that is, external safeguards on the entire programme—as "an inroad into our national sovereignty... at least I can't accept it."

**Only open road:** Dr. Ramanna expressed the view, in response to questions, that there was no reasonable alternative to nuclear power in India, that the programme remained very much committed to the 10,000 MW target (in terms of generating capacity) by the end of the century, and that nuclear power was "as safe as any other source of power on highly scientific principles of fail-safe."

Asked about the anti-nuclear sentiment that has been expressed in some quarters in India, he said: "I must say how disappointed we are with some criticism in India. It is either based on outmoded models of the sixties and seventies, or purely political in nature based on wrong assumptions."

**'Triumph of self-reliance':** Dr. Ramanna highlighted the story of atomic energy as a triumph of self-reliance, the foundations for which were laid very early in the development of the field. He paid a glowing tribute to the founding genius of Homi Bhabha and the close relationship struck, through him, with the highest levels of political decision-making in the country. He provided an assessment of the relationship of the atomic energy establishment with successive Prime Ministers—from the first, Jawaharlal Nehru to the present Prime Minister, Mr.

Rajiv Gandhi. About the last Prime Minister contribution, he observed: "I must say that during our worst days, Mrs. Gandhi supported us totally and completely. She could easily have said, 'Let's stop atomic energy and do something else' ..."

The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission dealt in detail with the experience of the 1974 PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion), the significance of PNEs as experiments, the change in international attitudes to peaceful explosions, the difference between a PNE and a weapon and so on.

He firmly argued for continued self-reliance and independence in the field. In response to a question about possible imports of new enriched uranium-fuelled, light water nuclear power systems, he said: "I think we must be somewhat consistent in our development programme. You know, introducing technology is good. But if there are too many breeds of technologies, maintenance becomes very difficult. This is like the steel plants, one from each country ... Then you'll never be able to develop your own because you are always dependent on them."

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CSO: 5150/0007

INDIA

AEC CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT TO VIENNA GROUP REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 24 Sep 85 p 9

[Text]

BOMBAY, September 23: Dr. Raja Ramanna, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, today expressed India's "deep worry about the possibility of a nuclear war, a nuclear winter and Star Wars."

In a statement made at the 29th annual general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) being held at Vienna, a copy of which was made available here, Dr. Ramanna said, "A prohibition on attacks on nuclear facilities would be a small step forward, and ideally should be preceded by all nuclear materials everywhere being used only for peaceful purposes."

India did not accept the non-proliferation treaty which actually legitimised the possession of nuclear weapons by some states. The distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states should not be brought into the IAEA, wherein all were equal members, he added.

"We cannot subscribe to the idea that some people are more responsible than others or that one country or person is morally superior to others," Dr. Ramanna remarked. He added that the effort going into the building of weapons should be diverted to the production of power in developing countries.

For introducing nuclear power reactors in developing countries and assisting in their operation and maintenance, India would be willing to make available its experience to other developing countries, Dr. Ramanna declared. The IAEA should help in arranging international funding for the power reactors in developing countries and help in providing infrastructure and technologies required, he added.

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CSO: 5150/0008



INDIA

# SPEECHES AT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT GROUP SEMINAR REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 23 Sep 85 p 17

[Text]

BOMBAY, September 22

**A**RGUMENTS for and against the concept of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia and diverse points of view on India's nuclear weapons policy options were brought into focus at a seminar and debate organised by the Group for Nuclear Disarmament (GROUND) here yesterday.

The director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, said that the main task before the country was to fight the nuclear imperialism of the five major nuclear powers rather than set up unviable regional nuclear weapons free zones.

He said that the talk of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia was only a trap to make India accept the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) which was discriminatory. Such a zone would only amount to accepting a protectorate status of the nuclear hegemonists, he added.

Of the four weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical radiological and nuclear the first three had been outlawed because it was not possible for any country to monopolise their manufacture. Mr. Subrahmanyam said. However, he said no discussions were ever held on the banning of nuclear weapons because it suited the five nuclear powers. In fact, the NPT legitimised the use of nuclear arms by

those countries, he added.

Mr. Subrahmanyam pointed out that a mutual inspection of nuclear facilities by India and Pakistan would not ensure a tension-free region. Both the countries should sign an international convention to outlaw nuclear weapons in the whole world, he said.

Supporting Mr. Subrahmanyam's point of view, Dr. C. Raja Mohan (IDSA) said that the arms control content of nuclear free zones was marginal and did not address to the central problem of the nuclear arms race.

Such a zone could not prevent countries within it to face the consequences of a nuclear war even if it was limited to nuclear weapon states, he said. He also pointed out that several nuclear weapons free zone treaties had in the past been violated not by the states in the zone but by the intervention of nuclear powers.

Though nuclear weapons free zones prohibited the deployment of nuclear weapons, they permitted their "transit" through the regions, Dr. Raja Mohan said.

Countering the earlier arguments, Mr. Achin Vanaik, journalist, said that a nuclear weapons free zone was the best way to establish nuclear security in South Asia.

He said that nuclear weapons were fundamentally different from conventional weapons and should be treated differently. Nuclear security which

could be defined as the right of the people in South Asia to be free from the danger of nuclear weapons, he said, should be separated from other kinds of security.

Emphasising that India should close its nuclear option, Mr. Vanaik maintained that it was not possible to establish a stable level of nuclear weapons with the policy of nuclear deterrence and said that deterrence was "an irrational act of faith".

Dr. Vivek Monteiro of the CITU said that India's desire to fight nuclear weapons would be best served by proposing and arriving at an agreement with Pakistan to exclude nuclear weapons and foreign nuclear-related facilities from the sub-continent.

Dr. Monteiro said that the best way to de-legitimise nuclear weapons and turn the tables on nuclear imperialists would be to opt for "disarmament unambiguity" rather than "nuclear ambiguity".

Dr. Alak Ray (TIFR) presented details of the techniques available to verify compliance with nuclear weapons free zones.

The seminar on 'India's nuclear weapons policy options' was inaugurated by the principal of St. Xavier's College, Fr. J. Misquitta. The two sessions were chaired by Mr. A. K. Damodaran, member secretary, policy planning committee, Union ministry of external affairs, and Prof. S. K. Bhattacharjee, nuclear physicist.

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CSO: 5150/0006



INDIA

BRIEFS

KALPAKKAM SECOND UNIT--Madras, 20 Sep--The first flush of power flowed out of the second 235 MW unit of the Madras Atomic Power Station at Kalpakkam, as it synchronised with the Tamil Nadu grid at 10-24 a.m. today. A Department of Atomic Energy press release stated that the power output would be increased in a series of steps to the peak output. The reactor, which attained criticality on August 12, was put through several tests since then. The reactor heat was used to raise steam and roll the turbine on September 6 and several runs of the turbo generator, a machine beset with vibration problems similar to MAPP-I's, were done in the presence of engineers from General Electric Company, Britain, and BHEL. A few more runs were planned so as to enable engineers to arrive at a formula to reduce the vibration. Other tests, such as the one to see how the system behaves when the power load is thrown off or sharply reduced, as well as the tuning of all plant controls will be done in the next couple of months. Commercial or stabilised operation of the set is likely to commence before the end of the year, that is, three months after it went critical. The first set had taken nearly six months to graduate into commercial operation. It was generating 220 MW today, and in the six months since April 1 had logged 666 million units of electricity, despite the odd shut down to correct the vibration in the turbine. [Text] [Madris THE HINDU in English 21 Sep 85 p 1]

WASTE IMMOBILIZATION PLANT--Managing the highly radioactive waste materials (high level waste) generated as a result of reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel discharged from power reactors is one of the most complex operations in the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Solidification of the high level waste in a matrix of glass so that the glass containing the high level waste can be buried in suitable underground rock formation is recognised all over the world to be the most promising method of handling high level radioactive waste. Realising the importance of satisfactory technology for handling radioactive waste in the successful implementation of a long range nuclear power programme, India started research and development work in the area of waste management quite early. A plant for the solidification of high level waste was built at Tarapur, near the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant. Recently, this Waste Immobilisation Plant (WIP) has been successfully commissioned. At present investigations are being carried out in some of the deep mines in the Kolar Gold Fields to study the characteristics of rock formations where solidified waste can be buried. Before being buried underground, the solidified waste in glass will be stored for nearly 25 years so that all the short lived and highly radioactive isotopes could decay and the activity level would come down to relatively low values. [Text] [Madris THE HINDU in English 18 Sep 85 p 16]

ISRAEL

SOVIET WRITER DESCRIBES NATION'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 3 Aug 85 pp37-40

/Article: "The Nuclear Industry in Israel"/

/Text/ This study is part of a book by the well known Soviet orientalist, the academician Yevgeny Primakov, which came out recently in Moscow. In the book, he follows the United States of America's Middle East policy from the early seventies to the end of the eighties of this century. We have chosen the chapter bearing on the discussion of the nuclear industry in Israel and the dimensions of its use.

Attempts by ruling circles in Israel to search for uranium and devise the necessary materials directly to produce heavy water began after the establishment of the Israeli entity in 1948.

After it became feasible for Israeli experts to extract uranium, albeit at low rates, from phosphate ore, they started to derive it as a byproduct from the processing of phosphoric acid. At the start of the fifties the necessary plant was constructed and the suitable equipment was erected in the town of Nahal Surik south of Tel Aviv; this produces about 50 tons of enriched uranium today.

In 1948, a number of Israeli scholars were sent on scientific fellowships to the United States, The Netherlands, Britain and Switzerland to specialize in the field of nuclear research. In 1949 a special department was established for radioactivity theory at the Weitzmann Institute in Rehovoth, and after the return of the nuclear scientists from abroad in 1954 this was turned into the department of nuclear physics. In 1952, the Ben Gurion government decided to form a special nuclear energy committee which would take charge of the task of coordinating and observing all activities related to nuclear power. This committee was subjected to direct supervision by the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

In 1953, France agreed to extend bridges of cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field, and, as a fruit of this cooperation, Israel managed to learn about the French nuclear program's study and participate in the nuclear tests France was carrying out in the Sahara, in exchange for provision by the

Israeli party of information related to the technology of producing heavy water and extracting uranium from phosphate ore.

Ben Gurion, benefitting from the preliminary results of Israeli-French cooperation and relying on the advice of his closest advisors, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, approved a plan to "develop the Israeli nuclear industry in an independent manner," after the Israeli forces were compelled to withdraw from Sinai, which they had occupied during the tripartite aggression of 1956. The plan at that time was marked by extreme secrecy, to a degree where, except for Peres and Dayan, members of the Israeli cabinet were not informed of it.

In fall 1957, Peres, by personal assignment from Ben Gurion, held secret discussions with French government representatives which at the beginning of October resulted in the signing of an agreement by virtue of which France committed itself to supply 26-megawatt-ton IL-3 nuclear reactors to Israel operating on natural uranium and undertook to offer help in the construction of a scientific research center which was built under circumstances of total secrecy in the Negev desert, in the Dimona area.

In roughly the same period in which work began on the construction of the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which was devoted especially to the production of uranium, the construction of another nuclear reactor was begun in the town of Nahal Surik, with the assistance of the United States.

The American aid was not confined just to the provision of the necessary money and technology; rather, it went beyond that, to include the preparation and training of the scientific personnel required to operate it. "Although the town of Nahal Surik did not have such military importance, it was extremely necessary for the development of the Israeli nuclear industry, because it had enabled Israeli experts and engineers to carry out their nuclear experiments as thoroughly as possible," wrote the Indian expert Radij, who worked at the Institute of Defense Studies in Delhi and studied the course of Israel's progress toward the possession of nuclear weapons in depth.

Ben Gurion's government was compelled to observe the general mood of opposition to nuclear weapons in the world and in Israel itself. Therefore, it constantly denied the intention to produce nuclear weapons. However, the situation became more difficult when six out of seven Israeli nuclear energy committee members submitted their resignations when they learned of the real intentions which lay behind the research taking place in the Dimona area and expressed their extreme opposition to the Israeli government program. However, the experiments in the Dimona area continued full force.

When General DeGaulle came to power in France, with his pursuit of a balanced policy in the Middle East, France's relations with the Arab world improved and the French government proceeded to review its cooperation with the Israeli government in the area of nuclear power and its uses.

On 14 May 1960, the French foreign minister at that time, Couve De Murville, summoned the Israeli ambassador in Paris and informed him of the French government's determination to stop selling Israel uranium, which the former French government had agreed to sell it.

In spite of Ben Gurion's attempts during his visit to Paris in June 1960, he failed grievously to set conditions straight in the area of nuclear power. Ben Gurion was compelled to accept French conditions bearing on provision of the necessary equipment and accessories for the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which took the form of:

1. An undertaking by the Israeli government not to produce nuclear weapons and to abstain from building a special plant to produce plutonium.
2. Frank open recognition of the fact that the nuclear reactor in Dimona had been erected and a commitment to use it for peaceful purposes only.

However, on his return to his own country, Ben Gurion did not hasten to confine himself to an open statement as he had in Paris, committing himself to it when he met with the French president. On top of that, the London newspaper DAILY EXPRESS came out on the morning of 16 December 1960, "bringing" to the world news under provocative headlines the gist of which was that Israel was on the verge of producing nuclear weapons.

Two days after that, the newspaper WASHINGTON POST, relying on official sources in Washing (the Central Intelligence Agency), published news that Israel would be able to produce nuclear weapons in 5 years.

On 21 December 1960, Ben Gurion was compelled to state the truth of the construction of the nuclear reactor in Dimona before the Knesset, stressing at the same time that the nuclear reactor would be used to carry out the necessary tests for laying a firm foundation for the development of agriculture and medical and pharmaceutical industries, that is, for peaceful purposes. He stressed that Israel did not "intend" to produce nuclear weapons.

However, this statement did not reflect the actual situation in this regard.

In December 1960, Ben Gurion affirmed to the United States' ambassador to Tel Aviv that he absolutely rejected foreign oversight over the nuclear reactor in Dimona, but that for the sake of the truth he would point out to the ambassador that he would permit Americans to visit the nuclear reactor from time to time--after the noise the press had stirred up over the Israeli nuclear industries had quieted down, however.

At the same meeting with the American ambassador, the Israeli prime minister promised to return the plutonium the nuclear reactor in Dimona produced to the country which had supplied Israel with uranium.

All these statements and promises were "out of courtesy" to international public opinion, which was uneasy with respect to Israel's hidden ambitions.

The changes which occurred in the Israeli leadership and Levi Eshkol's assumption of the positions of prime minister and minister of defense resulted in the obstruction of work in the production of its own nuclear weapons, especially since the view of Yitzhak Rabin and Igal Allon, who had tremendous influence in Eshkol's government, could be summarized in the point that the production of nuclear weapons required exorbitant costs and material expenditures which could be successfully used to buy traditional weapons. Eshkol, perhaps under the pressure of this point of view, and due to his exact knowledge of the costs of the Israeli nuclear project, because he had occupied the position of minister of finance in the previous government, presented a recommendation calling for the exchange of a visit by a delegation of American supervisors (overseers) to Dimona, in the case of readiness by President Johnson's administration to provide traditional American war materiel including Skyhawk fighter planes, Patton tanks and other modern weapons.

However, Eshkol did not go so far as to suspend activities in the area of the use of nuclear power for military purposes; rather, he contented himself with slowing down work and stopping it temporarily, until it would be feasible for him to activate work and continue it at a faster pace in an urgent fashion when necessary.

It is clear that regardless of the various opinions regarding Israeli military strategy, the fact in essence is that successive Israeli governments participated to one degree or another in constructing nuclear weapons, or, more correctly, the policy of producing nuclear weapons.

It would also be a mistake to ignore the influence of circles supporting and encouraging the production of nuclear weapons, including, for example, Moshe Dayan, who occupied ministerial portfolios in numerous Israeli cabinets.

This effect can be seen clearly and plainly through the discussion of an issue which at the time was surrounded by great secrecy, embodied in the construction of new buildings belonging to the nuclear thermal screen in Dimona.

At the beginning of 1968, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol issued an order to stop the construction work, but Dayan had previously given an order without the prime minister's knowledge to start the construction process. At that point Eshkol was compelled to cancel his order and agree to a fact which had become reality.

Golda Meir's assumption of the position of prime minister after Eshkol's death gave the Israeli nuclear program a strong impetus especially since two of the most intense proponents of this program, Rabin and Dayan, occupied sensitive positions in her government, which was formed in 1969.

In December 1963, the nuclear reactor at Dimona had become ready to start production, and in mid-1964 it reached the peak productive capacity provided for it in accordance with designs and required 25 tons of natural uranium in annual supplies. At the beginning it was managed to obtain this as follows: 10 tons from the racist Pretoria government, 4 tons from France and the rest extracted locally from phosphate ores.

Later, in 1969 Israel signed a secret agreement with France, according to which France agreed to offer an additional amount of uranium in exchange for the acquisition of technological aid in some nuclear industry areas. It is odd that this transaction, at least as far as some aspects of it are concerned, was made under circumstances where a group of Israeli intelligence (Mossad personnel within French territory took over a truck loaded with uranium belonging to the French government, and, after wounding the driver, managed to disappear with the load. Later, it became apparent that the uranium was transported to Israel by a special team.

However, Israel, at approximately the same period, managed to obtain a more secure source to supply it with uranium, the United States of America, although Washington's position regarding Israel's production of nuclear weapons seemed to be negative on the surface.

The American press, on the basis of information from the Central Intelligence Agency, often talked about Israel's determination to produce nuclear weapons and constantly exposed the secret activities the ruling Israeli circles were carrying out in this area. On some occasions, they covered provocative details on the Israeli government's nuclear activity. For example, TIME MAGAZINE's issue of 12 April 1976 published details of the confrontation by Israeli fighters of the Libyan civil aircraft which departed from its airspace because ground reconnaissance equipment had revealed that the plane was headed toward the nuclear reactor in Dimona. The reason for the American press emphasis on Tel Aviv's secret activities in the area of nuclear weapons can be attributed to the presence of disputes which existed in circles in the American administration and its specialized agencies. Some people opposed Israel's entry into the "nuclear club," and the American press was proficient at disclosing these disputes and exploiting them in order to publish precise details on Israeli nuclear industries. However, we would be mistaken if after all this we tried to reach a conclusion which concentrated on part of the American administration's rejection of Israel's ownership of nuclear weapons and ignored the tremendous material and technological aid Washington offered Tel Aviv relative to the construction of the nuclear reactor in the town of Nahal Surik, as we have pointed out previously. Alongside that, the United States did much in the area of Israel's realization of its nuclear program, through secret government organization channels or collusion between government agencies and the private sector.

A book by Rogers and Tsirvant, "The Nuclear Axis: Secret Cooperation between West Germany and the Republic of South Africa," has unmasked the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the provision of nuclear materials and technology to Israel at the beginning of the fifties. It is well known that the period between 1961 and 1969 witnessed repeated visits by a number of American specialists to the nuclear reactor area in Dimona. Each time these delegations would assert that the reactor was to be used only for peaceful purposes. The Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in this coverup whose purpose was to conceal the military nature of the nuclear reactor in Dimona, is not to be ruled out.



However, a greater substitute for United States involvement in execution of the Israeli nuclear program was embodied in Washington's provision of Israel's requirements for the enriched uranium needed to produce the nuclear bomb under extremely secret circumstances. Both Newman and Rixon later revealed the secret of the disappearance of 800 units of uranium and plutonium which the results of investigations show were sent to Israel. This massive quantity was missing from the storehouses of the American nuclear equipment and materials company, UMIC, in the state of Pennsylvania.

In April 1979, ATLANTIC MONTHLY magazine published an article on the operation of removing the uranium in which it pointed out that the American committee concerned with nuclear power discovered a "disturbing discrepancy" in the period from April 1964 and November 1965 between the quantity of enriched uranium the government had provided to the UMIC company and the materials processed from it and prepared for consumption by the American citizen.

It later became apparent that the UMIC company had been appointed to be a company which would technically supervise the nuclear reactor and prepare the specialized Israeli staff in the United States, and that the president of this company at that time, Shapiro, had maintained special strong relations with Israeli officials. These facts may perhaps provide an explanation for the cause of the disappearance of tremendous amounts of uranium and plutonium from the company's storehouses.

In December 1974, the American committee concerned with nuclear supervision listened to statements by the deputy head of the Central Intelligence Agency for science and technology affairs, Carl Wackett. In response to questions from members of the committee, he asserted "The leakage of enriched uranium to Israel is to be considered a reasonable possibility." In the secret statement he gave before this committee, he pointed out "The disappearance of enriched uranium from the UMIC company storehouses occurred at the same time as Israel's production of nuclear weapons," and stressed that the Central Intelligence Agency, relying on its special estimates of Israel's nuclear potential, arrived in 1968 at the conclusion that Israel had nuclear weapons. The chairman of the agency at that time, Richard Helms, informed President Johnson of this fact, but the president asked him to conceal it and prevent the leakage of any information on it.

The United States continued to offer the necessary technical aid to enable Israel to carry out its nuclear program. Toward the end of 1969, the American State Department declared the sale of 50 F-4 Phantom aircraft to Israel, outfitted with a system specially prepared to carry out a nuclear attack. Although Washington denied selling Israel such a system, the American magazine NEW SCIENTIST disclosed that the Israeli airplane industry was capable of introducing specific improvements into these airplanes so that they would be able to carry nuclear bombs and launch a nuclear attack.

In July 1975, after the Central Intelligence Agency had confirmed the truth of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, the American Defense Department offered military aid to Israel which included 200 Lance class air-to-air

missiles, each of which was capable of carrying destructive traditional and nuclear warheads, and a large number of F-15 and F-16 aircraft, also outfitted to carry nuclear bombs. Although the American Congress imposed an embargo on the provision of military aid to countries which produce nuclear weapons, this embargo was at no time applied to Israel.

In addition to the United States and France, West Germany and the Republic of South Africa offered Israel aid which enabled it to produce nuclear weapons. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and West Germany in 1965, Tel Aviv received massive financial aid which was allotted in full to nuclear research at the Weitzmann Institute. After disclosure of the American company UMIC's secret shipments to Israel and the repercussions of that in paralyzing that company's ability to continue with its mission, West German-Israeli ties in the area of nuclear cooperation were strengthened. In 1968 Heman and Kohn referred to the conclusion of a transaction between Bonn and Tel Aviv by virtue of which the latter received 200 tons of uranium in exchange for providing the necessary laser technology to produce enriched uranium and paying a sum of \$3.7 million. This quantity was shipped by the vessel Shirsburg and was packed in special boxes bearing the name "European Atomic Energy Agency." In the desire to deceive international public opinion and conceal the collusion between West Germany and Israel in the production of nuclear weapons, a Mossad group intercepted the vessel in the middle of the Mediterranean and secretly diverted it to Israel.

The beginning of cooperation between Israel and the Republic of South Africa in the area of nuclear weapons production goes back to the mid-fifties. At that time, specifically, a transaction was concluded between the two parties on the basis of which Israel provided nuclear technology in exchange for the acquisition of uranium. The following years witnessed a perceptible development in this area, especially following the visit the prime minister of Pretoria made to Tel Aviv in April 1976 and his signing of an agreement with the latter related to scientific, military and technological cooperation. Israel quickly reaped the fruit of this cooperation. On 22 February 1980, the American television network CBS, based on information of its correspondent in Tel Aviv, broadcast the news that Israel had carried out a nuclear explosion in cooperation with and with the help of the government of South Africa.

The TASS agency statement issued by the Soviet government on 9 August 1977 warned international public opinion of the possibility that the Pretoria government would carry out a nuclear explosion in the Kalahari Desert with Israel's help; which deprived Pretoria of the chance to carry out its nuclear explosion. One should bear in mind that the American satellite had recorded the occurrence of a tremendous explosion in the area alongside the coast of South Africa on 22 September 1979, but the United States preferred to maintain a silence--which did not last long, thanks to the announcement by John Scali, a senior official in the American television network ABC, who had previously worked in the American State Department, of the fact of the explosion. On 22 February 1980 the American television network CBS, on the basis of firm



information from its correspondent in Tel Aviv, Dan Raviv, broadcast news that Tel Aviv had carried out tests on nuclear weapons with Pretoria's cooperation and in coordination with it.

It appears from the statement the Central Intelligence Agency representative made at a meeting of specialists in the space field held in early 1976 that Israel had from 10 to 20 units of nuclear weapons ready to use when TIME magazine's issue of April 1976 published news that Israel had had 13 nuclear bombs ready for use by airplanes of the Kfir and Phantom classes, and Ariha missiles, equipped for this purpose in 1973.

By the testimony of the American TIME magazine, Israel, during the October war, hurriedly, in the course of 78 hours carried 13 nuclear bombs from some area in the desert to a secret underground tunnel. At that time Israel was prepared even to blow up American spy planes (in the manner of the Israeli torpedoing of the American ship Liberty during the 1967 aggression.

This magazine carried an actual copy of the order issued to Israeli fighters to move to an area near the American SR-71 spy plane and bring it down. However, the spy plane rose to an altitude which it was difficult for the Israeli airplanes to reach, and it managed to return to its base safely with information of the utmost importance in its possession.

It is of course not to be ruled out that this incident was a "game" that had been prepared through which the United States intended to obtain information to enable it to learn the farthest step Israel would go to in the event Washington stopped supplying Tel Aviv with advanced modern weapons.

After Begin came to power, Israeli nuclear strategy during his term was used to realize two objectives, the production of nuclear weapons and the development of means for transporting them and ways of using them, and the attainment of Israel's nuclear dominance over the region as a whole. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that contacts were strengthened in the realm of the use of the atom for military purposes between Tel Aviv and Pretoria during Begin's term.

In reviewing the evaluation of the nuclear explosion Israel and the Republic of South Africa carried out in the Indian Ocean in September 1979, even the Central Intelligence Agency was not able to hide the purpose behind it, which, according to its assertion, was embodied in the creation of a highly-developed tactical nuclear weapons system, while the explosion took place by means of a special system the governments of Tel Aviv and Pretoria had bought from the United States, which had previously claimed it was just used in the area of space exploration.

The particular characteristics of Begin's program in the area of war industry assumed a form where he did not oppose the program for nuclear power for military purposes with plans to create and develop the traditional weapons industry. All the disputes which existed during previous governments on the

ratio of nuclear to traditional weapons were contained in the era of the Likud government by creating a sort of exact balance between the two types of weapons and the urgent effort to develop both at the same time and not cause interest in one weapon to prevail over the other.

As we pointed out previously, Begin's nuclear strategy had the goal of spreading an Israeli nuclear umbrella over all the countries of the region. The period which followed the signing of the Camp David agreement witnessed a vicious Israeli attack against Iraq as a result of the latter's ability to produce nuclear power in the near future. One should bear in mind that Iraq had accepted visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had admitted that the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was built with the aid of France, was not capable of producing nuclear weapons. In spite of that, Iraq became the target of a treacherous Israeli action, which as well as serving the Likud government's election purposes also aimed at spreading terror and panic in the governments of the Arab countries, regardless of whether they had or intended to have and build nuclear reactors in the future.

The sequence of events developed in the following manner:

On 4 April 1979, three tourists carrying European passports appeared in the French city of Toulon located on the Mediterranean coast. Two days later, three people joined them at a small hotel in the city, and, after a period of time, they went in two small trucks to the town of (Liacine Tourmer), where the storehouses of the French Federation of Banks are situated, the main portions of which were reserved for the nuclear reactor which was to be sent to Iraq in 24 hours. After that, an explosion occurred which was immediately reported to a number of French newspapers by a person of unknown identity who said that the explosion had been organized by an organization which called itself "The French Environment Society." It later appeared that no one, even the French police departments, had ever heard of the existence of any such organization; the French security department even stressed that only an organization which had a high degree of competence and expertise could have carried out that operation. The French newspapers commented on this operation by stating "The Mossad bears direct responsibility with respect to it."

On 13 September 1980, the body of the Egyptian atomic scholar whom the Iraqi government had invited to occupy an important position in the Tammuz nuclear reactor, who had traveled to France with the objective of ascertaining that the systems met the requisite specifications, was found in the Meridian Hotel in Paris.

On 7 August 1980 a bomb was set off near the headquarters of the Italian firm Sinatechint, next to the house of its general director, Mario Fiorelli, in Rome. One should bear in mind that that company had agreed to participate in the construction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. A letter was found at the site of the explosion, signed by a group which called itself "The Committee for the Defense of the Islamic Revolution," containing the following: "We

know of your personal relations with the enemies of the Islamic revolution." A number of European scientists in France, Italy and even Iraq received similar letters threatening their lives with danger if they insisted on taking part in the activities of building the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

It was clear from the beginning that these threats could not be separate from the planning and execution of the Israeli intelligence agency, which used the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guard agency as a facade behind which to conceal its base, lowly activity.

On 7 June 1981, Israeli airplanes penetrated the air space of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor. This terrorist crime provoked a wave of anger, condemnation and contempt among broad segments of international public opinion which proved in a manner which left no room for doubt Israel's blatant violation of international charters and usage and the principle of nations' sovereignty over their territories.

Though Washington, under the pressure of world public opinion, was compelled to condemn this crime, it was in reality the one that enabled the Israeli aggressors to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor by supplying the equipment required for that and creating the appropriate political circumstances, without which the ruling circles of Tel Aviv would not be able to dare to carry out such an operation.

This terrorist operation reinforced the doubts of people concerned with and specialized in Middle East affairs, including Americans who are actually interested in this area and not just interested in propagating and justifying the American administration's hostile platform, that the crisis in the region could assume more critical dimensions, in the nuclear sense.

In this regard, the former American deputy secretary of state, Harold Saunders, wrote "Belief in the possibility of stopping the supply of traditional and complex weapons to the countries of the Middle East without concern for the attainment of a peaceful solution or in isolation from a peaceful settlement is to be considered a flight from reality." At the same time, Saunders stressed "A peaceful solution will require the reduction of aid in nuclear areas."

It is well known that Israel has not signed the treaty of commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Israel's signing of this treaty and its commitment to put its nuclear arsenal under the supervision and oversight of the International Nuclear Energy Agency (which the Arab countries have agreed to), and the adoption of further measures, including the two parties' commitment not to use nuclear weapons against one another, could result in the failure to impart a nuclear hue to the Middle East crisis.

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CSO: 5100/4506

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY DISCUSSES PAKISTAN'S ALLEGED PLAN FOR TEST IN PRC

BK311405 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 21 Oct 85 p 9

[Editorial: "Nuclear Skullduggery"]

[Text] "Beg, Borrow or Steal". That has been the stock-in-trade of Pakistan in its headlong rush to acquire a nuclear arms capability. Its scientists have stolen nuclear secrets from several Western countries, and Zia has borrowed heavily the hard cash needed to perfect the device from Libya and Saudi Arabia. Now that the country is nearing its nuclear goal, the Pakistani ruler is begging China to provide facilities to test its nuclear device lest it be found out. By carrying out the test in China, Pakistan can feign innocence to the U.S. putting the responsibility on China. It can, in the meantime, have the satisfaction of knowing that the Islamic bomb is not after all a dud and can be used as a "blackmail" weapon as and when required. But the price the Pakistanis may have to pay China could possibly be heavy, almost akin to mortgaging their country.

So the disclosure by the Indian Army Chief, Gen. A.S. Vaidya, that Pakistan may be planning to carry out a nuclear test in the Chinese region of Sinkiang need not come as a surprise to those who have been watching Sino-Pak movements and the hush-hush exchanges between their nuclear experts. Gen Vaidya, who should know what is going on across their borders, revealed that the Chinese nuclear reactors and test ranges were located in the Lop Nur region north of the provincial capital of Urumchi which is connected to Pakistan by the Karakoram highway.

The quid pro quo arrangement that apparently has been worked out by the two leaders is that Pakistan will place at Chinese disposal all the secrets regarding uranium enrichment that its top scientist stole from a European country. The Chinese are interested in the latest methods that have been perfected in the West, specially in the nuclear field. In return, China does not mind sharing its secrets on the Hiroshima-type weapon, which it perfected almost 20 years ago. Also allowing Pakistan to test its first weapon on Chinese soil may put the former totally under Beijing's sway, both politically and militarily. Zia obviously is willing to pay that price if only it helps him to flaunt his nuclear toy.

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CSO: 5100/4712

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN SAID READY TO TEST NUCLEAR DEVICE IN PRC

LD302206 Moscow TASS in English 1856 GMT 30 Oct 85

["Pakistan's Sinister Plans"--TASS headline]

[Text] New Delhi October 30 TASS--Pakistan is ready to test a nuclear explosive device, the Indian newspaper TRIBUNE reports. The holding of that experiment will become the decisive stage in the creation of its own nuclear weapons by the Islamabad military regime. It is planned to stage the test in China, in the Taklamakan desert, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the newspaper reports. The yield of the device will be about the same as that of a charge exploded by China in 1964.

Six Pakistani nuclear specialists have already arrived in Xinjiang to prepare the experiment. Part of technical equipment necessary for staging the explosion was moved there from the Pakistani range in Multan.

The TRIBUNE reports that the decision to hold the test of a nuclear device by Islamabad in the People's Republic of China was adopted at Pakistani-Chinese talks a month ago. Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Munir Ahmad Khan had earlier ruled out the possibility of staging such an explosion at the Multan range.

According to the newspaper, Pakistan has considerably sped up the preparation for nuclear tests in the past ten months, putting into operation at once two enriched uranium production plants. The equipment for the plants was secretly bought from Britain, the FRG and other West European countries. Electron elements for the explosive device of the atomic bomb, krytrons, were bought by Pakistan from the USA with the connivance of the U.S. authorities.

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CSO: 5100/4711

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY URGES CLARIFICATION OF REAGAN REMARKS

GF021402 Lahore JANG in Urdu 27 Oct 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The United States Should Be Asked To Clarify"]

[Text] What actually took place between President Ziaul Haq, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan on the subject of nonproliferation of atomic arms in South Asia has become controversial. Parties to the talks have made several contradictory claims. However, the BBC has recently shed some light on the subject.

After the Ziaul Haq-Rajiv meeting, Pakistani media reported that an agreement had been reached for studying the question of possible proliferation of atomic weapons, and that both agreed to hold discussions between their technical experts aimed at preventing the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the region.

The Indian media reported that no clear agreement was reached on the subject and that both sides had only agreed on the need to exchange views on the issue. However, the Indian prime minister, after his meeting with President Reagan, said that during their meeting President Reagan first proposed that India agree to Pakistan's proposals on the subject which President Ziaul Haq made in his address before the UN General Assembly. But later during the same meeting President Reagan said that before Pakistan's atomic program could reach a point of no return India must act on her own to check its course. Mr Rajiv Gandhi then said that he had asked Mr Reagan what he meant by that. Mr Gandhi added that President Reagan's remark had puzzled him.

According to U.S. sources, President Reagan only suggested to Mr Gandhi that India should try to reach some understanding with Pakistan over this sensitive issue.

The above details show that all is not very clear regarding the talks between Ziaul Haq and Mr Gandhi, or between President Reagan and Mr Gandhi. However, the most alarming aspect is that according to the Indian prime minister, President Reagan advised Mr Gandhi that before Pakistan's atomic program gets out of hand he must take steps to stop it. This is a very profound revelation which even if only slightly true reveals the true nature of U.S. friendship with Pakistan and also shows how far the Western countries

and the United States are willing to go in order to stop the efforts of any Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Pakistani Government first should ask the United States what President Reagan meant by the phrase quoted by Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

India, which wants to see Pakistan weak and India stronger, is willing to use any strategy to gain that objective. The Indian mass media for a long time have been vigorously attacking Pakistan's atomic energy program. But during the past few months, this campaign has assumed an even vaster and louder quality. In a recent press conference in New Delhi, Mr Rajiv Gandhi went so far as to say that he does not want to see Indian cities reduced to the rubble of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His remark suggests that he was accusing Pakistan of intending to make the bomb and use it against Indian cities.

However, this is a false accusation and is calculated to malign Pakistan.

For the past year there have been reports that India was to make a pre-emptive strike against atomic installations in Pakistan, but that the strike was postponed because of the death of Mrs Indira Gandhi. But now, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, quoting President Reagan, has revealed that what took place between them was even more sinister than the original Indian pre-emptive plan.

As far as Indian intentions are concerned, Pakistan has never entertained any euphoria about them. However, to think that even the United States can go that far was unthinkable.

Anyway, we would not like to make any further comment on the matter until it becomes clear what actually took place between Mr Reagan and Mr Rajiv Gandhi during their meeting.

Mr Rajiv Gandhi's attitude, after having accepted President Ziaul Haq's proposals as logical, of not laying his cards on the table, reveals that India is not willing to reach any agreement over the question of nuclear weapons with Pakistan and that Pakistan should not wait for India's reactions, but should continue to carry out its atomic energy program greatly needed for its national interests.

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CSO: 5100/4715

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS REAGAN REMARKS, GANDHI'S MOSCOW VISIT

GF021419 Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 28 Oct 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The Repercussions of Gandhi's Moscow Pilgrimage"]

[Excerpts] There have been attempts to depict Mr Gandhi's visit to Moscow, on his return from New York to Delhi, as sudden. Even Indian radio has attempted to show that he was supposed to return to New Delhi after a brief stopover in the Netherlands, plans which he allegedly changed at the last minute. But his welcome by Mr Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and other high officials and subsequent talks definitely give the impression that the visit was far sudden and had been planned at home or in New York. He did not go to Moscow in response to a sudden summons; he merely felt that he had to go in view of the dependence that India has on the Soviet Union.

It is possible that Mr Gandhi's goal was to report on his U.S. visit, or to personally convey a message from the U.S. Government. Last June he visited Washington with his foreign secretary, Mr Bhandari; he then dispatched Bhandari to Moscow. Now with his personal sojourn to Moscow the attention of the world in general and Pakistan in particular has been drawn to his statement made before the journalists' association at the United Nations regarding his meeting with President Reagan, in which he said that the U.S. President said: "You must stop Pakistan before it reaches a point of no return." Mr Gandhi later stated that he did not understand the implication of this enigmatic statement by Reagan, but U.S. officials later clarified the statement. The U.S. President has not clarified the statement attributed to him by Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and according to Mr Asghar Khan [leader of defunct opposition party], the 40th anniversary of the United Nations has brought untold anxiety for Pakistan which no amount of clarification by the U.S. State Department can remove, nor will it alloy the fears of the Pakistani people. He is not far wrong in saying that it does not matter what President Reagan has said. But what is important is how Mr Gandhi has interpreted it and what he plans to do about it. Speculation will continue on whether Mr Gandhi's trip to Moscow was preplanned or whether it was a spur of the moment decision. The crux of the matter is what plan he will submit to his Soviet mentors and how much support and assistance he will receive from the Soviet Union in this matter. Collusion and collaboration between Moscow and India is not a new phenomenon, but what matters for Pakistan is that if Rajiv Gandhi's statement regarding Pakistan's nuclear



program--which he has attributed to Mr Reagan--is not true, and if Mr Rajiv Gandhi's interpretation presented before the world is fallacious, then Mr Reagan should refute it immediately. It will not help if the State Department issues repeated clarifications because Mr Rajiv Gandhi's utterances will be given more importance, especially as he has made such a statement before the world.

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CSO: 5100/4715

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS GANDHI'S REMARKS

BK301207 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] From the New Delhi reports which have now come out with the correct version of the meeting between the prime minister of India, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and the U.S. President, Mr Ronald Reagan, whatever confusion or misunderstanding which might have been occurred as a result of the earlier reports emanating from New York should now be clear. The New York report on the face of it was already quite questionable and this creates some degree of speculation about its possible interpretation.

The prime minister of India was reported to have told the press that during his meeting with the President of United States the latter has said why don't you stop Pakistan in its nuclear program, whatever he means by it. Naturally a quotation of this kind was bound to get misinterpreted and indeed it mystified almost everyone. But for the clarification of the possible version of the meeting as explained by the president of Pakistan, General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, on his return to Islamabad from New York, the conclusion would have been persisted.

President Ziaul Haq, while talking to newsmen at Islamabad airport, recalled his own meetings with President Reagan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and said he had no doubts in his mind that what the U.S. President could have told the prime minister of India must have been to enter into some positive negotiations with Pakistan on the subject and cooperate in the program of nuclear nonproliferation so as to ensure that there was no danger of any nuclear threat in the South Asian region or between the countries concerned, that is, India and Pakistan. The president of Pakistan's interpretation turned out to be correct. The reports, which are now being circulated following the

press conference of the Indian prime minister in New Delhi, confirmed to the version given by the president of Pakistan in his press conference at Islamabad. The New Delhi reports maintain, according to the Indian prime minister, that he was asked by the U.S. President to reach an understanding with Pakistan and get down to working out an agreed program to ensure that there was no nuclear threat or possibility of developing nuclear weapons in the region.

It may be recalled that the president of Pakistan in his address in the General Assembly on the occasion of the 40th commemorative anniversary of the United Nations had as the founder member nation (?viewed) the question concerning nuclear nonproliferation to the regional perception as different from the global perception. The president of Pakistan had offered to India a complete program which will ensure that South Asia is turned into a nuclear free zone and there is (?definitely) no nuclear competition or threat between India and Pakistan. The president said that he had explained Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program to the President of U.S.A. as well as to the prime minister of India. The fact that the President of U.S.A. was convinced that Pakistan's case was evident, from Mr Reagan's own statement that he was convinced that Pakistan did not have any intention of making an atom bomb. As for Mr Rajiv Gandhi, there should be no reason that what could convince the President of U.S.A. should not be equally convincing to him. In any case, the offer made by the president of Pakistan in this regard is clear, categorical, and forthright. There should be no reason why it should not be acceptable to India provided the general idea is to ensure that there is no nuclear threat to the countries of Southeast Asia.

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CSO: 5100/4712

PAKISTAN

MINISTER TERMS GANDHI STATEMENTS 'BASELESS'

BK061625 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 6 Nov 85

[Text] Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani has said allegations against Pakistan by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in interviews given to various U.S. magazines and newspapers are totally baseless and false. Speaking on three identical adjournment motions in the National Assembly in Islamabad this evening, he said the India Government has not been able to produce any concrete evidence to support its allegation against Pakistan regarding assistance to Sikh extremists. He said that India has achieved an extensive nuclear capability, free from international safeguards, under the smoke screen of propaganda statements in connection with Pakistan's nuclear program. It has stockpiled enough plutonium to be able to build atomic weapons. It also conducted a nuclear explosion in May 1974. He said that Pakistan, on the contrary, has forwarded various proposals to India to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons and has also proposed an agreement on the nonacquisition and nonmanufacture of atomic weapons.

Mr Zain Noorani said the United States has also told India to hold talks with Pakistan to keep South Asia free from atomic

weapons. But it is regrettable that India has rejected it. He said an (?impartial) observer fully understands the fact that the responsibility of nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia lies with India and not with Pakistan.

The minister of state for foreign affairs presented excerpts of the *INDIAN EXPRESS* editorial regretting the totally negative response to the various Pakistani proposals regarding a mutual pact on nuclear installations. He said he hoped that the Indian Government will take note of the views of society's important and influential quarters and will adopt a constructive attitude to these proposals.

Speaking on five other adjournment motions, Zain Noorani said reports published in the foreign press and later appearing in the Pakistani press regarding fierce fighting in the Siachen Glacier area are incorrect. He said there has been neither air nor land fighting, nor have there been 200 casualties. He said the Indian newspapers have also published the report quoting their official sources describing the reports of fierce fighting in the areas as false.

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CSO: 5100/4715

PAKISTAN

FOREIGN MINISTER REITERATES POSITION ON NUCLEAR ISSUE

BK291632 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Text] Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan has reiterated that Pakistan is ready to go all the way with full sincerity and solemn commitment to solve the nuclear issue with India. He was speaking on similar adjournment motions moved in the Senate today by Mr Mohammad Tariq Chaudhury, Maulana Kauser Niat O, MR Mohsin Siddiqui, and Nabi Baksh Zehri.

The foreign minister clarified the various proposals put forward by Pakistan publicly and privately. These proposals include signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by both countries, a bilateral agreement for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, guarantees for safeguards on a bilateral level, and inspection of each other's nuclear installations. He said if India does not accept these proposals, then Pakistan is ready to consider any proposal that could solve this issue, which has been the reason for tension between the two countries and has created misunderstanding in the United States and the Western world. The foreign minister said President Mohammad Ziaul Haq had advanced this argument during his meeting with the Indian prime minister. The president also clarified this point during his talks with President Reagan. He said it is clear that all efforts to solve the nuclear issue are being made on a regional basis. If a solution to the nuclear issue is to be found, then it has to be of a regional nature.

Referring to Rajiv Gandhi's statement in New York that President Reagan told him that you should stop Pakistan before its nuclear program reaches a point of no return, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan recalled that on his return home from New York the

president had told a press conference that as far as he understood it, the U.S. President's statement had been misquoted. What President Reagan actually meant was that if India had any apprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear program, it should talk with Pakistan because this issue was of a regional nature. The U.S. State Department has corroborated our view. A State Department spokesman said yesterday that the United States is most certainly not encouraging India to take any unilateral action against Pakistan in this matter or in any other connection. The spokesman said it is in the interest of both India and Pakistan that they should work together to reduce the nuclear threat.

The foreign minister also referred to the Indian prime minister's statement made on his return home, as broadcast by All India Radio. In this statement he clarified his first statement [in New York]. He clearly stated that President Reagan told him that India should reach an agreement with Pakistan on the nuclear issue before the matter reaches a point where a settlement is not possible. The foreign minister said this statement has ended the concern and anxiety created by Rajiv Gandhi's statement in New York.

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan said our defense preparedness for protecting the Kahuta installations from an attack are as high as our resources permit. He clarified that if such a situation arises, it will surely be an act of war and under such circumstances Pakistan will have no option but to retaliate with all its might. After the foreign minister's statement, the senators did not press their motion.

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CSO: 5100/4710

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS PAKISTAN'S ASSURANCES, U.S. TRUST

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 30 Oct 85 p 6

[Text]

We have had occasion to comment on Indian nuclear perceptions in South Asia a few days earlier. In the course of these comments the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's statement at New York about what President Reagan told him was quoted. The words attributed by him to Mr. Reagan then were: "You stop them before their programme goes beyond the point of no return". But on his return to New Delhi he is reported to have informed newsmen that "Mr. Reagan told him that India should reach some understanding before its (Pakistan's) nuclear weapons programme reaches the point of no return." The difference between the two versions of the statement should be noted. In the later statement the emphasis is on the need for a regional understanding. And if one stretches the point a little, it also implies a sort of warning about the dangers to which absence of understanding between the two countries could lead. This version is much closer to

what President Zia-ul-Haq said about his meeting with Mr. Reagan. President Zia said that Mr. Reagan appreciated the viewpoint of Pakistan, considered the nuclear issue to be regional in nature and had tried to persuade Mr. Gandhi to respond to the proposals made by Pakistan for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. These proposals have been mentioned frequently enough by us and need not be repeated here, but the point to be noted is that President Zia was clearly able to convince not only Mr. Reagan but also others whom he met within the U.S. administration and outside about the bonafides of Pakistan's stand. That this he was able to achieve, despite quite a few well-entrenched anti-Pakistan lobbies in the U.S., deserves much more credit than seems to have been given to him. Appearing in the Cable Network News programme (broadcast in the U.S. the other day), for example, President Zia squarely faced charges about making a nuclear bomb that Senator

Cranston recently levelled against Pakistan and rebutted them quite forcefully. And this is not the only occasion where he was called upon to clarify Pakistan's position on this issue. In his numerous meetings with the U.S. and other media men during his recent visit to New York, he was able to plug this point again and again quite successfully. It will be recalled that the fibs against Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme had recently started implicating China as a provider of technology and testing-ground for an imaginary bomb. The President has been able to dispel all such wild notions. President Reagan is on record as having told the Times of India correspondent as recently as

October 26th that the U.S. had "no evidence" that Pakistan had the bomb and therefore the sale of arms to Pakistan was to continue. In fact the question of extending such sales beyond 1987, when the U.S. President's waiver against the Symington Amendment (banning sales of arms to nuclear weaponstates) expires, that is currently being examined in the U.S., further testifies to U.S. trust in Pakistan as being a non-nuclear weapon state. The Indian Prime Minister may still retain some doubts about Pakistan's nuclear programme, despite sincere efforts made by President Zia to remove them, but apparently no such doubts exist within the U.S. administration now.

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CSO: 5100/4716

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS INDIA'S 'NUCLEAR LEAP,' PAKISTAN'S POSITION

Karachi DAWN in English 23 Oct 85 p 5

[Text]

INDIA's nuclear status is now in full glare. It has become the first Third World country, and the seventh in the world, to have acquired the capability to build and run a fast-breeder reactor with domestic technology and fuel. A fast-breeder reactor is suitable for uranium enrichment and it can produce U-233, a weapons-grade material that can be used for building atomic weapons. In 1974, India demonstrated its capability to make the bomb through plutonium. In August this year, it announced the commissioning of a new 100 MW research reactor which can yield very substantial quantities of plutonium. This can be used as fuel in fast-breeder reactors as well as in making bombs. This, together with the possession of domestic technology and fuel, means that the operations at the two latest plants will be untrammelled by safeguards, inspection or monitoring by any foreign or international agency. India has, thus, demonstrated its double-capability for making nuclear bombs — through either plutonium or enriched uranium. As capability is almost as good as being in possession of an arsenal in this field, the new fact poses a threat of added dimension to the non-nuclear States in the region.

In the face of such a high degree of sophistication of its nuclear programme, with a pro-

ven military potential, the current stepped-up campaign against the so-called "bomb" being made by Pakistan sounds rather sham. One wonders whether the year-round propaganda drive against this country by New Delhi was a smokescreen to cover up its own accelerated progress in this field. This may also have been intended as a device to soften up likely international reaction to its latest nuclear advancements when these come to be known. Recently, the Indian Prime Minister went as far as to state that "Pakistan may already have an atom bomb which it may not need to test". His Chief of the Army Staff went a step further to say that "Pakistan was planning to carry out its first nuclear test in the Chinese nuclear ranges in northern Sinkiang". Such wild and unsubstantiated allegations and insinuations have been rebutted time and again and, from the look of things, it seems unlikely that the refrain would stop if the charge is refuted yet again.

One plausible explanation for India to have opted for the fast-breeder reactor is that it can convert thorium, of which there is an abundant reserve in that country, to produce energy. If energy shortage is the only consideration behind the decision to develop the fast-breeder reactor, then the policy-makers in New Delhi

should have no difficulty in recognising the sheer compulsion for Pakistan to want to have its own nuclear programme. It has to cope with a much greater shortage of energy than India does. New Delhi has achieved quite a success in striking oil in off-shore areas. It hopes to fill a considerable part of its needs from these sources. So, it is in a position to extend energy supply even to forestry areas to remove the compulsion for felling of trees for heating purposes. In Pakistan the situation is not that happy even by a long stretch. We have not yet had any oil from off-shore areas. Our energy resources are still inadequate to our industrial, transport and domestic needs. The huge gap cannot be filled by expensive imports. Hence the compulsion for developing nuclear energy potential for making up the large deficit.

As for the Indian allegation that Pakistan's nuclear pro-

gramme has a military aspect to it, this country has repeatedly offered to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provided India does so too. It is also willing to enter into arrangements with India for mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. But it is on record that the response from the other side has consistently been negative. The clear possibility is that with its new strides in the development of nuclear self-sufficiency, India is far less likely to be amenable to any proposition regarding guarantees of non-military use of its nuclear potential and capabilities. It is for the impartial world opinion to discern the basic difference between the positions of the two countries on this issue and, in particular, to see the real motive behind persistent attempts to malign Pakistan's much less ambitious and developed nuclear programme.

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CSO: 5100/4716



PAKISTAN

INDIA'S PROPAGANDA MOTIVES ANALYZED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 18 Oct 85 Magazine p I

[Article by N. H. Mashmeyer]

[Text]

INDIA's "anti-bomb" propaganda against Pakistan has been more or less uniform ever since Mr. Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother as Prime Minister about a year ago. Not that it was not there before the young Nehru ascended the throne. It has never abated.

The "circumstantial evidence", as Mr. Rajiv Gandhi put it the other day, was not available then. Nor, perhaps, had "communion" been held yet with CIA and Mossad, the chief informants on the Muslim world. Tied to the apron-strings of the Soviet Union, India has only been a strictly formal customer in the United States. At least that has been India's pretence. What happens under the counter in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi is known only to the few at the top in the three capitals. However, one may be sure of the existence of the "bomb information axis" comprising Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi. The intelligence agencies or the three countries have been keeping the Muslim world under the strictest possible watch. The so-called "circumstantial evidence", to which the Indian Prime Minister referred at his news conference at the Press

club in New Delhi on October 11, must have been made available to the Indian intelligence agency by CIA directly or by Mossad through CIA. The aims of all the three agencies have been common ever since the Arab oil boom, the Ramazan War and the emergence of Pakistan as a towering member of OIC.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has lately been dinning it into the ears of the world — and India has long been making that noise — that Pakistan has already made a bomb or is very close to it. This anti-Pakistan propaganda becomes strident, vicious and non-stop every time its Prime Minister goes abroad. His autumn 1985 itinerary includes trips to London and the Bahamas from where he goes to New York to attend the 40th session of the U.N. General Assembly. So, this is the right time to warn the "peace-loving" world against Pakistan's atomic intentions. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi made similar noises in summer this year on his visits to the USSR and the USA. This time, however, under "expert" tip from local as well as "axis" advisers, he has adopted a more sinister line. "Other countries have been providing part of the funds to Pakistan. This means that

Pakistan will have to supply nuclear weapons, when developed, to its financiers". Now, these two sentences are loaded with venomous mischief. By "other countries" Rajiv obviously means the oil-producing Arab states, which, in turn, leads one to what the Zionist lobby in the U.S. and elsewhere has been labelling as the "Islamic bomb". This remark of Rajiv Gandhi's establishes India's collusion with Israel. In plain words, Rajiv is inviting Israel to team up with India to do a Baghdad in South Asia too.

Rajiv does not stop there. "It is not India alone which is threatened. The whole world will have to ponder over the consequences of Pakistan acquiring nuclear capability". Here Rajiv's "whole world" shrinks to the U.S. and its protege, Israel, both deadly opposed to any Muslim state going nuclear. When Rajiv tells Western media that Pakistan is "fairly advanced" in nuclear bomb technology, he is, in fact, serving notice on the U.S. and Israel that the sands are running out. This, indeed, is the hard core of India's big mischief. "If China has become an atomic Power, we are not bothered", Rajiv tells a foreign journal. "But if Pakistan achieves a breakthrough, it will cause us grave problems".

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## AN INSPIRED QUESTION

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To depict Pakistan as a monster, an Indian newsman asks his Prime Minister at his October 11 Press conference in New Delhi whether India may suffer a Hiroshima or a Nagasaki at the hands of Pakistan. This was, apparently, an inspired question. "No", says Rajiv. "We will not allow New Delhi or, for that matter, any other city in India to be flattened out".

Now, what does this exercise prove? Hardly a day passes when the Indian Prime Minister does not raise the Pakistani bomb bogey. The idea, as Mr. Zain Noorani pointed out in the National Assembly the other day, is to divert the world's attention from India's own advanced preparations for nuclear weapons. The well-known American columnist Jack Anderson came out with the scoop the other day that India was developing a hydrogen bomb. Some India-watchers, however, are of the view that it would be a misnomer to call Jack Anderson's story a scoop. For, less than two months after India's underground test, a UNI report, frontpaged in several newspapers one morning, quoted informed sources as saying that the country's Atomic Energy Commission was working on a hydrogen device as a follow-up to its first nuclear test, using plutonium. Although official sources in New Delhi refused to comment on the UNI report, the news agency, to back its report, quoted a statement of Dr. Raja Ramanna, Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, that "another exciting event that may thrill the nation more than the underground blast was in the offing". Incidentally, Dr. Raja Ramanna was on the Indian T.V. recently elaborating on India's nuclear plans. Talking to a

fellow scientist (in the studio), he said, in passing, that making a bomb was no more a complicated affair. This remark of Dr. Ramanna's confirmed Rajiv Gandhi's claim that India was in a position to produce a bomb within weeks or months. As long ago as 1964, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Shastri Cabinet, had claimed that India was in a position to produce the bomb within 18 months. Some reports later disclosed that India was "storing arms-grade plutonium in a manner it could fabricate a bomb in days and on a scale it could manufacture 20 of them in a year". The atomic device exploded by India in 1974 was made from plutonium.

India was reported to have begun large-scale production of plutonium in November 1973 at the Tarapur reprocessing plant, near Bombay. It started stockpiling "separated" arms-grade plutonium in a special storages room, pending decision at the highest level whether it was to be fed into fast breeder reactors producing still more weapon-grade plutonium or into a bomb fabrication mechanism. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was reported to have decided in favour of the stuff being fed into the bomb fabrication mechanism. This was followed by reports that India had completed preparations for a second nuclear test in Rajasthan.

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## INDIRA & SON'S IRRITATION

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During the years following India's nuclear test in Rajasthan, Pakistan shook off its complacency and took first major decisions on the quickest possible means of acquiring nuclear capability for peaceful purposes. This rattled Mrs. Indira Gandhi. She "voiced her grave concern over Pakistan's efforts to manufacture nuclear

bomb and said this had added a new dimension to the security of India". Her son and successor, Rajiv, has repeatedly been using more or less the same language on Pakistan's peaceful progress in the nuclear field.

When India exploded its nuclear device in May 1974, the official announcement said that "it was part of its programme on the study of peaceful nuclear explosions. The government wanted to keep itself up to date with nuclear technology, particularly with its use in mining and earth-moving operations".

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's comment was characteristically her own. When asked what Pakistan's reaction could be to the test, she said, "We are not bothered about reactions from anywhere". Later, on being informed by her agents that Pakistan, too, was well set on the same road, she assured Lok Sabha that India would respond "in an appropriate manner" to Pakistan's nuclear activities. This was the time when India was giving finishing touches to her second test site near Pokharan, in Rajasthan. The site and the device are ready. Only the fuse is to be ignited when the device is in the right place.

The Nehru dynasty would never accept Pakistan as a friend and a good neighbour because its own intentions have been suspect. India wants the world to believe that its nuclear policy is peaceful. "We can produce the bomb within 18 months. But I think we should not deviate from our stand and use atomic energy

for peaceful purposes only", said Mrs. Gandhi in her early days of power. Her son and successor, Rajiv, has been ahead of her in uttering clichés and warnings. He will never believe that Pakistan, too, is desperately in need of nuclear energy to power its development projects. For his benefit, let us hark back to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In a speech in October 1952, he had said, inter alia, that "atomic energy represents a tremendous power. If this power can be utilised as we use hydroelectric power. It would be a tremendous boon to mankind because it is likely to be more available and cheaper than the building of huge hydroelectric works .....".

Will the above quotes from his grandfather's speech assure Rajiv that Pakistan, too, regards atomic energy as "a tremendous boon to mankind" and is keen on using it along the lines indicated by the great Pandit?

If, to quote Rajiv, Pakistan is "fairly advanced" in nuclear technology, how does it endanger India's security? Did China's atom bomb threaten India? No Pakistani will believe that India will ever drop a nuclear bomb on his country. Nor would any Pakistani believe that his Air Force will do the same over India.

Let us hope that one day, in none so distant future, India and Pakistan would settle down as good neighbours, like the U.S. and Canada, and, exchange scientific and technological know-how to implement their nation-building projects along the most modern lines.

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CSO: 5100/4716

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS INDIAN ALLEGATIONS

GF261806 Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 21 Oct 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The Charge Leveled by the Indian Chief of Staff"]

[Text] The Indian chief of staff has accused Pakistan of conducting nuclear experiments with the PRC and has stated that the PRC Government is cooperating with Pakistan in the nuclear field. President Ziaul Haq has clearly refuted this charge. He reiterated to correspondents at Islamabad airport prior to his departure for New York that Pakistan has no intention of carrying out nuclear experiments with PRC. The PRC Foreign Ministry also refuted this allegation in an announcement in Beijing, saying that this is a baseless accusation and the PRC Government cannot comprehend why such irresponsible statements are made.

India has recently stepped up its campaign of spreading false propaganda and malicious lies about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, but the Indian chief of staff's recent statement has exceeded all limits. It has involved both the PRC as well as Pakistan, despite refutations by both sides. The two sides which have been accused should assess the ulterior motives behind such accusations and demand an official explanation from India, because such an accusation has been made by no less a person than the chief of staff of the armed forces — not a minor politician. Along with vehement protest against such a statement, an official explanation should be demanded.

If the Indian Government desires firm, cordial relations with Pakistan and wishes to improve its relations with the PRC, then it should refrain from initiating a war of words in the region. Saner circles in India should also take notice of such random accusations and baseless statements and should make it clear to the government that peace is essential for the welfare of the people of the area and that all attempts at sabotaging it should be foiled.

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CSO: 5100/4709

PAKISTAN

INDIA CRITICIZED FOR NUCLEAR PROGRAM 'TIRADE'

BK260607 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1715 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Station commentary]

[Text] The president, General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, told the United Nations General Assembly last night that Pakistan and India should reassure each other that they will not use nuclear energy for destructive purposes. The president reiterated a 5-point proposal from Pakistan:

Firstly, the two countries should simultaneously sign the nonproliferation treaty; secondly, the two sides should accept full scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; in the third stage, they should accept mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; fourthly, they should have a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons; finally, the president said that they should agree to the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. He said that Pakistan is ready to attend any conference to achieve this end on the basis of reciprocity and respect of sovereignty. The most important aspect of the president's speech before the world body is that the Pakistan Government would further the convening of a conference on development of peaceful nuclear energy among the countries of the South Asian region.

The president's speech at the United Nations General Assembly meeting should finish once and for all the wrong impression which persists among certain countries regarding Pakistan's nuclear program. No leader in the world could ever make such outright statement as the president has done. This fully demonstrates that Pakistan has no evil designs to go nuclear for military purposes. If any country still wants to deceive the world opinion on Pakistan's nuclear program, they will be sadly mistaken now by such a clear offer, made by President Zia.

Unfortunately, a tirade has been launched by certain countries, which include India on the top, against Pakistan's nuclear program. This was done with the motive to implement their own designs in garb of a propaganda against Pakistan. Obviously they want to malign Pakistan that it is going nuclear; and they could justify before the world that since Pakistan is going nuclear they were compelled to make an atomic bomb. This is a [word indistinct]. Pakistan has asked India repeatedly to sign the nonproliferation treaty and to simultaneously accept full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Regretfully, India has never responded to Pakistan's proposals, but instead it continues harping on the propaganda that Pakistan is about to make an atomic bomb. Pakistan has again offered that the two countries must accept mutual inspection of each other's nuclear installations, but India has deliberately not responded to the suggestion. [Words indistinct] that India has decided not to accept any reasonable proposal from Pakistan and to continue its nefarious propaganda against Pakistan to misguide its own people about Pakistan's nuclear designs and also to mislead the world opinion. Pakistan has time and again demanded that Southeast Asia [as heard] should be declared a zone of peace and that the world powers should not use this area for their nuclear designs.

The president has made the latest offer for the convening of a conference on the development of the peaceful nuclear energy among the countries of the South Asian region. What else can Pakistan do to assure certain countries of the world who deliberately do not want to understand and also deliberately close their eyes from the fact? The president's latest offer for the convening of a conference in the region must now finish once and for all the misunderstanding about Pakistan. A country engaged in making an atomic bomb cannot agree to the mutual inspection of its nuclear installations. This is very clear and should be understood by all. The Pakistani leaders have time and again reiterated that Pakistan does not want to go nuclear because it does not have the required capability nor the resources. The other thing is that Pakistan is a developing country with limited resources. The prime need of Pakistan is to look after its own people and to provide them a decent living.

The question now arises: Why should Pakistan go nuclear? It is needless to emphasize that Pakistan does not have any aggressive design against any neighboring country, for all the more against India where, according to the present census, today the Muslim population is more than 1,400 million [as heard]. Can any sensible man ever think of using an atomic bomb against its neighbors and for that matter on its own brothers in the faith now living in that country? Can Pakistan ever think of using a bomb against the country with which it enjoys close ties both in the cultural and religious fields? The deliberate propaganda against Pakistan is meant to misguide the world opinion. It is well known that during the last few decades ever since the subcontinent achieved independence, India has always used its brutal force to decide the issues.

The question of Jammu and Kashmir, about which the president has also stated in the General Assembly, is yet to be resolved on the basis of the commitment which India itself has made in the world body on a number of occasions. Instances are not lacking that India has always tried to intimidate its small neighbors. In spite of [words indistinct], India does not want to miss a single opportunity to malign Pakistan. It is hoped that the logical proposals made by President Zia for the convening of a conference of the South Asian region to discuss the nuclear energy problem will be favorably responded to by all the countries in the region so that the air of mistrust is removed and the countries refrain from leveling baseless allegations against each other.

PAKISTAN

ALLEGED 'SUSTAINED PROPAGANDA' BY INDIA RESENTED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Oct 85 p 8

[Text]

THE State Department clarifications of what President Reagan said or did not say to the Indian Prime Minister should be of small consolation to the Foreign Office since they are not the point at issue. The important thing is the public construction Mr Rajiv Gandhi puts on remarks made to him in private. And if he chooses to twist them or to draw from them the worst possible inferences his readiness to do so should be our main worry rather than doubts about the steadfastness of our alliance with the United States. Indeed ever since he came to power Mr Rajiv Gandhi has expended much of his considerable skill in public relations to launch a sustained propaganda blitz against Pakistan's nuclear programme. In this he has been wiser than his mother for instead of raising the bogey of American arms supplies to this country, he has sought to play on American susceptibilities by conjuring up the vision of a Pakistan within reach of the atomic bomb. There is a brazen quality to this propaganda as it is being carried on (at full blast) in the face of repeated assertions made here at the

highest level that Pakistan neither has the bomb nor is interested in getting one. Pakistan has proposed to India mutual inspection of our nuclear facilities and it has consistently stood for turning South Asia into a nuclear-free zone. If India thinks Pakistan is bluffing it can easily call its bluff. Or it can take Pakistan at its word and examine its proposals. But if, assuming a holier-than-thou attitude, it treats every thing with scepticism, the conclusion is plain that either India has something of its own to hide or it is simply using the nuclear issue as a stick with which to beat Pakistan.

If India is unwilling to enter into a constructive dialogue Pakistan is entitled to ask what exactly Mr Gandhi has in mind. Are his Generals preparing an air strike against Kahuta? If they are, by advertising their intentions to the whole world, they are going about it in a strange fashion. Alternatively, having noticed the chink in our armour, is India trying to drive a wedge between us and the Americans? Possibly, because nothing is more calculated to arouse American concern in this region than the spectre of an "Islamic" bomb and the de-

stabilisation of American interests that would be one of its likely consequences. Or is Mr Rajiv Gandhi trying to test our nerve and probe our psychological defences? Is there in that case a connection between the nuclear blitz and Indian brinkmanship around the Siachin Glacier? Whatever the precise answers the situation is unsettling. We continue to share with India an uneasy border and although much has happened since South Asia last rang to the clash of arms, no one can say that the threat of war has been completely averted. Mr Rajiv Gandhi's statements can therefore only revive memories of 1971. So, axiomatically, Pakistan must be on its guard, but if this is not to be another cliché it must mean taking the people into confidence and demystifying foreign policy. It should not be treated with kid gloves and must be debated thoroughly in Parliament. But above all else, there must be no delay in returning Pakistan to representative civilian rule because without mass participation in the affairs of State, no nation can expect to present a united front in facing up to threats from without.

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CSO: 5100/4716

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY ALLEGES INDIA HAS BAD INTENTIONS

GF021818 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 28 Oct 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Why There Is No Peace in the World?"]

[Excerpts] Answering questions from correspondents, Rajiv Gandhi said that Pakistan's proposals were insufficient and were therefore rejected. He said President Ziaul Haq's proposals on the face of it look very comprehensive, but these are not enough to satisfy us. I wish Rajiv Gandhi had given some reason as to why he was dissatisfied with them and how he could be satisfied. He also referred to his talks with President Reagan on the question of Pakistan's nuclear threat. He said that President Reagan at first assured him that Pakistan had no program to make atomic weapons, but that President Reagan also added that if India thought that Pakistan's nuclear program was about to be completed then India could stop it any way it likes.

Rajiv Gandhi has thus caused a question to arise: What did President Reagan, after all, mean by these words? We think the uncertainty is in the mind of Rajiv Gandhi because he fanatically wishes that Pakistan's nuclear installations be destroyed somehow. The words that he attributes to President Reagan have not been published in any paper. Rajiv Gandhi himself admits that he was assured that Pakistan had no program to make nuclear weapons. If President Reagan is sure that Pakistan's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, why would he advise India to deal with Pakistan any way it likes? Quite the contrary, President Reagan considers peaceful and friendly relations between Paki-

stan and India vital for regional and world peace. He has advised both countries that in order to keep their own region free of nuclear danger, both should join hands and make some security arrangements. American authorities have now clarified that in his meeting with Rajiv Gandhi, President Reagan only stressed that India should react positively to Pakistan's proposals for nonproliferation of nuclear arms. Rajiv Gandhi believes, it seems, that just as Israel destroyed Iraq's nuclear installations, India should also have the right to destroy Pakistan's nuclear installations. We think that such wishes of countries given to aggression are the main hurdles in the way of regional and world peace. It is the duty of all countries to follow the policy of "live and let live" and give up for good the idea of using force. The manufacturing of nuclear arms should be declared illegal. This is the only way to make the world happy and peaceful in the real sense through the United Nations. Pakistan is a small country. Like most countries, it wants the world to be saved from war, hunger, and disease, and all nations should live in peaceful coexistence. However, big countries are engaged in the malaise of imposing their hegemony over others. They maintain their own circles of influence and they strive to expand these circles. India also is dreaming of becoming a mini-superpower in South Asia. It will not accept that Pakistan should live on equal terms with it. We therefore think that India's intentions toward us are far from good.

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CSO: 5100/4715



PAKISTAN

POSSIBLE INDIAN THREAT VIEWED

GF040409 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Rajiv-Reagan Rancour"]

[Text] Following his recent visit to New York to attend the 40th special session marking the United Nations foundation, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi spoke about his meeting with President Ronald Reagan which has caused concern to Pakistan. Referring to the Pakistani nuclear programme in a speech made before a media forum, Rajiv Gandhi quoted Ronald Reagan as having told him that "you (India) stop them (Pakistan) before their programme goes beyond the point of no return, whatever that means."

For a head of government to quote the American President so openly and in such a manner does not augur well for either the state of peace in the region or for our bilateral relationships. While there has been no clear contradiction of the American President's remarks quoted by Rajiv Gandhi, it will definitely be perceived as almost a green signal to the Indians to act against our nuclear programme. In fact, "whatever that means" will, in all probability, be read as "by whichever means." Pakistani spokesmen have also tried to clarify Reagan's remarks with a view to diluting their real import. It is not for Pakistan or any other country to interpret or clarify what the Indian Prime Minister publicly proclaims was told to him in private by the U.S. President.

Given the context of the concentrated Indian campaign against the Pakistani nuclear programme, this statement assumes a significance which will not be lost on any discerning observer. An ambiguous assurance or clarification from Islamabad won't do. What needs to be done is for the Pakistan Government to seek a clarification from Washington. Only when such a clarification comes from the White House itself will public opinion in Pakistan be reassured that Reagan did not give the nod to whatever plans Rajiv Gandhi may have in mind against our nuclear programme.

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CSO: 5100/4714

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

NOORANI ON ATTACK THREAT--In reply to a question, Zain Noorani said Pakistan's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes and is geared toward fulfilling the country's energy requirements. In reply to another question about the possibility of Israel attacking Pakistan's peaceful nuclear installations, he said we are fully prepared to defend these installations from attacks by Israel or any other country. We have information about one more country which has painted its planes the color of Afghan planes and is keeping them ready for attack on our nuclear installations. Replying to another question, Noorani said if India comes forward with a categorical statement on this issue, we can build an atmosphere of trust between the two countries. Replying to a question about the present state of India-Pakistan relations, Zair Noorani said he is confident that the recent meeting between Pakistan's president and the Indian prime minister will pave the way for better relations between the two countries. When asked whether India and Pakistan have agreed to begin technical negotiations on nuclear issues, he said Pakistan understands that the experts of the two countries will hold talks to convince each other of the procedure for removing mutual apprehensions. [Excerpt] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 1 Nov 85 BK]

GANDHI'S COMMENTS REPORTED--The Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, has ruled out the possibility of any kind of bilateral nuclear nonproliferation treaty with Pakistan. Talking to newsmen in New Delhi today, he confirmed that during talks in New York, President Reagan said that Pakistan does not have a nuclear weapons program and advised him to initiate bilateral negotiations with Pakistan in this regard. The Indian prime minister also said that his government is not closing its option on a nuclear weapons program. He denied reports that India has any intention of carrying out a preemptive strike against Pakistani nuclear installations. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 1 Nov 85 BK]

PRAVDA CITED ON TEST--The Soviet newspaper PRAVDA says Pakistan is resorting to more and more aggressive actions against India. Dismissing Islamabad's claim that its nuclear activities are purely of research nature, the paper today says Pakistan has either already tested nuclear weapons in Xinjiang or is on the verge of doing so. Criticizing the United States for making Pakistan an obedient partner, it says so long as the flow of U.S. arms into Pakistan continues, Pakistan's foreign policy will remain unchanged. The daily points out the overwhelming portion of Pakistan Armed Forces was concentrated on Indian borders. [Text] [Delhi General Overseas Service in English 1330 GMT 22 Oct 85]

**ZIA REITERATES STAND**--President Mohammad Ziaul Haq has reiterated that Pakistan has neither the desire nor the capability and means to produce a nuclear bomb and wishes to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. He said this in an interview with Egyptian mass-circulation daily AL-AKHBAR. The president begins a 3-day state visit to Egypt from Saturday. He said the reports that Pakistan was in possession of a nuclear bomb were merely anti-Pakistan propaganda. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in English 1005 GMT 31 Oct 85 BK]

**ZIAUL HAQ ON ISRAELI THREAT**--Cairo AL-AHRAM International Edition in Arabic 31 October 1985 carries on page 6 a 5,000-word interview with President Ziaul Haq of Pakistan by Fahmi Huwaydi in Islamabad on an unspecified date. The interview centers almost entirely on questions of applying Islamic Shari'ah laws in Pakistan. Among other things the questions deal with the relation of Shari'ah laws to current methods of rule and the administration of justice in Pakistan. Ziaul Haq discusses his philosophy of governing, guided by Islamic tenets. Asked about the Israeli raid on Tunis and whether this action heightened Pakistan's fear of a similar attack on the Pakistani nuclear reactor in Kahuta, Ziaul Haq says: "The Israeli attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunis is a crime by any standards. It is also an insult to all Arabs and all Muslims, and even to all the values of international legitimacy. The U.S. President's support for the operation is astonishing and lacking in wisdom." He adds that "the possibility of Israel's attacking the Pakistani nuclear reactor with the assistance of others remains a likelihood. We have warned our friends in the West and told all the parties concerned that if such aggression takes place we will consider it an act of war, to which we will reply in the appropriate manner." [Editorial Report]

**MINISTER ALLEGES INDIA MANUFACTURING BOMB**--Speaking on an adjournment motion in the National Assembly yesterday, the minister of state for external affairs, Zain Noorani, assured the house that there is no change in U.S. policy on Pakistan. He said that the United States had repeatedly said that its attempts to improve relations with India would not have any impact on existing relations with Pakistan. Speaking on two other similar adjournment motions, Zain Noorani said that the Indian leaders are leveling false and baseless allegations against Pakistan on the nuclear issue, whereas India itself is busy manufacturing materials for an atomic bomb and is finding pretexts to manufacture nuclear weapons. The aim of the Indian propaganda is to divert the attention of the world from its nuclear weapons program. He said as far as Pakistan is concerned it has repeatedly said that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes and it has no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Besides, Pakistan feels that South Asia should be free of nuclear weapons, and that this would be in the interest of the whole region. Pakistan has made many proposals in this connection and it hopes that India will accept Pakistan's initiative for serious talks on this issue. [Text] [Karachi Overseas Service in Urdu 0500 GMT 5 Nov 85 BK]

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CSO: 5100/4714

SYRIA

USSR REPORTEDLY TO TRAIN SYRIANS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LD121402 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1315 GMT 12 Oct 85

[Text] Beirut, 12 Oct (KUNA)--The Lebanese magazine AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DAWLI reports in today's issue that "the USSR is moving [yatawajjah] toward supplying Syria with nuclear weapons."

Quoting the ambassador of an Arab Gulf country in the Syrian capital, the magazine says that Syrian Defense Minister Lt Gen Mustafa Talas had disclosed recently that the USSR has decided to supply Syria with "nuclear weapons."

The magazine quotes the ambassador as saying that "this matter has become almost definite and that Syrian specialists will be leaving for the USSR to train on this type of weapons."

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CSO: 5100/4502

SOUTH AFRICA

# NEW CYCLOTRON TO BENEFIT RESEARCH, INDUSTRY, MEDICINE

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 23 Oct 85 p 7

[Text]

THE National Accelerator Centre — which was officially opened by the State President at Faure, Western Cape, last week — is an important national resource that will benefit basic and applied research, industry and medicine.

It is also a triumph of home-grown technology, for the centre's separated-sector cyclotron (SSC) was designed and assembled entirely by NAC staff. While some of the larger components were manufactured overseas, the final machining of the magnet pole pieces and the manufacture of many other components were undertaken by SA firms, a process which resulted in the acquisition of considerable expertise.

Housed behind huge concrete walls in a building the size of two rugby fields, the cyclotron absorbs 7MW — equivalent to the electricity used by a town the size of Parys — to accelerate sub-atomic particles to a maximum energy of 200MeV (million electron volts).

Protons (the nuclei of hydrogen atoms) thus accelerated reach about 60% of the velocity of light, at which speed they would travel four times around the Earth in one second.

The cyclotron has been designed as a flexible instrument, capable of accelerating different sub-atomic particles and of generating neutrons (uncharged particles with a mass almost equal to that of protons).

Proton (or gamma) radiation has long been used successfully in the treatment of cancerous tumours. Protons have the advantage that the dose can be delivered accurately within tumour volume, minimising damage to surrounding healthy tissue.

Neutrons, however, appear to be more effective in controlling certain types of tumour than the radiation from cobalt sources or linear accelerators and, according to Dr D T L Jones, chief medical physicist of the NAC Medical Component, Faure will be one of the first centres in the world where neutron therapy can be given a fair trial.

In a paper published in the *SA Journal of Science*, Jones says the medical services which will be offered at the NAC promise to be the most advanced of their type in the world.

Facilities on-site at the R100m Faure complex — a multi-disciplinary research institute of the CSIR — will include three radiotherapy treatment rooms, an isotope production area with a nuclear medicine wing, laboratories, offices and patient handling areas, facilities for experiments on animals, an operating theatre complex and a 30-bed hospital for use by patients undergoing treatment requiring constant supervision and who are too ill to withstand regular transport.

These facilities will be under the control of the hospital department of the Cape Provincial Administration, but are at the disposal of qualified medical personnel throughout SA.

While the beam has been established in the cyclotron, it is expected that it will take at least a year of physical and radiobiological experiments before the first patient can be treated safely. When the NAC is fully operational, it is hoped to treat up to 600 patients a year. Many more patients will be helped by the iso-

topes produced at Faure and transported to hospitals throughout SA.

During treatment periods it is estimated that the beam will be in use for only about 20% of the time. In between times, it will, where practical, be switched either to isotope production or research. Full, separate facilities have been established for the different disciplines and the beam can be diverted magnetically to the appropriate facility as needed.

Cyclotron-produced isotopes generally have properties superior to those produced in a reactor. They are free of chemical contamination, and the half-lives of medically useful isotopes are often shorter, meaning that the cumulative dose of radiation which the patient has to endure is reduced.

Some of the isotopes that will be produced at Faure are so short-lived that they can neither be imported nor transported to the Cape from the existing cyclotron in Pretoria, built more than 25 years ago. A major consideration of the siting of NAC was that it is near to both Groote Schuur and Tygerberg teaching hospitals, both of which have major radiotherapy departments.

Where their half-lives permit, export of isotopes is likely. Indeed, exports of isotopes produced at Pretoria are now worth about R500 000 a year, according to CSIR deputy president Dr Gorra Hey-

mann. The main buyer is the US. Among the uses to which SA-produced isotopes have been put is the analysis of Martian soil.

The Faure cyclotron is both more powerful and more flexible than the Pretoria one. This means that it will be able to produce valuable isotopes — such as iodine 123 — more abundantly and cheaply, and it will be able to produce isotopes that have previously been unavailable in SA, including experimental isotopes for which practical applications have yet to be found.

Apart from medical uses, isotopes are increasingly important in research and industry. Among their practical uses are chemical and mineralogical analysis, the measurement of wear inside operating machinery and the precise tracing of the absorption of fertiliser into crop plants.

As a national resource, beam time will be provided free of charge to qualified SA personnel, and it will also be available for use by overseas scientists and patients.

It also has another extremely important benefit, as indicated at the official opening by CSIR president Dr Chris Garbers. "When we ourselves can produce at the highest level," he said, "we will have access to high-level overseas research."

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CSO: 5100/5

SOUTH AFRICA

NUCLEAR POWER TO BECOME ECONOMICAL

Johannesburg ENGINEERING WEEK in English 12 Sep 85 p 10

[Text]

**EngineeringWeek:** The price of electricity generated at Koeberg, South Africa's first and, for the moment, only nuclear power station, is significantly higher than the average national price. With South Africa firmly committed to going the nuclear route, using locally-enriched uranium, which, due to economies of scale must necessarily cost more than imported fuel, what are the short and long-term cost implications?

Els: Escom must, of necessity, look at nuclear power because, at the moment, it is the only viable alternative energy for South Africa. Our hydro potential is limited, as is the potential for utilising oil. Gas could be used in future, but it could be very expensive.

Against this backdrop, we must develop the technology to use nuclear energy. By the middle of the next century, our reserves of coal will probably have been significantly depleted, and if the nuclear technology does not exist, it will create problems.

So we have gone ahead and built our first nuclear reactor, and we have learnt from it in terms of the problems associated with it, and in terms of the advantages. And we will, in the next decade, probably have to build more nuclear power stations.

Nuclear power stations have higher

costs than coal-fired base load power stations. There are two basic reasons for this. One is that the capital cost is higher because, particularly after the Three-Mile Island episode, the cost of installing safety systems has increased dramatically.

Generating power in any nuclear station therefore costs anything between 50% and 100% more than it does in a coal-fired station.

Secondly, nuclear fuel is, at present, more expensive in South Africa than coal. Measured against a world average between \$30 and \$40 a ton, our coal, at between R12 and R13 a ton, is relatively inexpensive. Nuclear fuel in other parts of the world is cheaper than coal, and operating costs of nuclear installations elsewhere are lower.

In South Africa, the use of nuclear fuel is at present not economical, but this is something that, in time, will probably change. Indications are, though we cannot say with certainty, that the cost escalation of nuclear fuel will be lower than that of coal, so that, in 10 or so years' time, nuclear fuel will again be competitive in base load stations.

On that basis, we will certainly in future be looking at building nuclear power stations though, at this stage, we have no definite plans.